HLU -v- Stafford Borough Council (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2026-BHM-000108

In the High Court of Justice                 
King’s Bench Division                        
Administrative Court

16 March 2026

Before:

HHJ Tindal (Sitting as a Judge of the High Court)

Between:

THE KING on the application of HLU

-v-

STAFFORD BOROUGH COUNCIL

Order

Notification of the Judge’s decision on the application for interim relief

After consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant only.

ORDER by HHJ Tindal (Sitting as a Judge of the High Court)

  1. Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4)) and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction:
    a) No person shall identify the Claimant in connection with these proceedings. The Claimant shall be referred to as HLU.
    b) A non-party may not obtain or inspect a copy of any Statement of Case, or any other document filed with the Court and to which a non-party may have access pursuant to CPR 5.4A-D or otherwise, unless it has been produced or edited so as to comply with para.1 of this Order and/or any subsequent direction made by the Court.
    c) Anyone affected by the terms of this Order shall have permission to apply to vary or set aside any part of it, on 3 working days’ notice.
  2. Application for interim relief is granted. The Defendant must, by 4pm today Monday 16th March 2026, provide suitable accommodation for the Claimant and her child pending the outcome of these proceedings or further order.
  3. Liberty to the Defendant to apply to vary paragraph 2 on 12 hours written notice to the Claimant.
  4. By 4pm on 23rd March 2026 the Defendant shall file an Acknowledgement of Service and response to the order of interim relief.
  5. By 4pm on 30th March 2026, the Claimant may file a Reply.
  6. Costs in the case.

Reasons

  1. This is a judicial review brought by a disabled Claimant in person for herself and her disabled child relating to urgent housing. I grant anonymity. The Claimant says that following a domestic abuse incident, she applied for homelessness assistance and on 22nd January 2026, she and her child were accommodated by the Defendant in B&B accommodation. The statutory 6-week limit (see R(Pickford) v Sandwell MBC [2024] EWHC 756 (Admin)) expired on 4th March 2026 and the Claimant asked to be re-accommodated in suitable accommodation for her and her child by 11th March 2026.  
  2. On 12th March 2026, the Claimant issued these proceedings seeking a mandatory order to be accommodated in suitable accommodation. She maintains that an offer of an accommodation unit ‘Hyde Court’ was not suitable because of her child’s dietary needs and its 3-mile distance from her school. As I was in the process of considering this application on referral to me on 16th March, the Claimant notified the Court that the Defendant has today 16th March 2026 now offered her what appears to be suitable accommodation in a 2-bedroom house, but it is only available from May 2026. The Claimant has acceoted that offer. It appears that in the meantime, the Defendant proposes the Claimant and her child move from her present B&B accommodation to a different hotel until Thursday 19th March, when she will be re-offered the accommodation at Hyde Court from then, presumably until she and her daughter can move into their new home in May 2026.
  3. The Claimant has a strongly arguable case that her stay since 4th March in B&B accommodation has been unlawful and Hyde Court’s distance from the child’s school will be problematic in the absence of public transport. However, the Claimant must understand that what may not be suitable long-term can be suitable short-term and if Hyde Court is the only accommodation practically available given that she has rightly said further stay in B&B accommodation is unlawful, that may be all there is until May. However, I will make an order for interim relief requiring suitable accommodation, as it seems to me strongly arguable that Hyde Court is only suitable, even if the short-term, if the Claimant can practically get her daughter to school, which is unclear.  However, the Defendant can address that in its expedited response.