HNT -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2026-LON-001708

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

14 April 2026

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Bourne

Between:

The King
on the application of
HNT

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

UPON an application by the Claimant for an injunction to restrain his removal to France on 15 April 2026

AND UPON consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and by the Defendant

ORDER by the Hon. Mr Justice Bourne:

  1. For the purpose of this application, and solely to preserve the position, the claimant is granted anonymity and is, until further order, to be referred to in these proceedings as “HNT” (“the cipher”). The claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not to be disclosed in any proceedings in open court. There is to be substituted for all purposes in these proceedings in place of references to the claimant by name, and whether orally or in writing, references to the cipher. Pursuant to s.11 Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings. Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4): (a) The parties must, when filing any statement of case, also file a redacted copy of that statement of case omitting the name, address and any other information which could lead to the identification of the claimant. (b) Unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4(C)(6), no non-party may obtain an unredacted copy of any statement of case.
  2. The application for interim relief is refused.
  3. Costs reserved.

REASONS

Serious issue to be tried

Ground 1: Unlawful elevation of the reasonable grounds threshold

I do not agree that the decision maker changed the threshold. Rather, the decision letter explains why the conclusion was reached that the reasonable grounds threshold had not been reached. That was by reference to a lack of detail and to significant inconsistencies in the accounts of events which the Claimant gave. The decision maker expressly noted that a potential victim’s circumstances may explain a lack of detail or a lack of consistency, but there is no rule of law that a decision maker must always conduct a further investigation in that regard. The observation of a lack of supporting evidence was made in the context of those two findings and was not a decision to apply an elevated test. I see no failure to apply the correct test.

Ground 2: Failure to follow guidance

Arguably the Defendant did not follow the strict letter of her policy which requires the provision of an opportunity to “clarify” any inconsistencies. But, as has been observed in other cases, the policy is guidance, not a statute. The Defendant is entitled to apply it in a sensible and practical manner. It was open to the Defendant to conclude that inconsistencies in the Claimant’s account went beyond what could have been resolved by clarification, and the policy cannot sensibly be interpreted to require an attempt at clarification even in such a case. It does not seem to me that there is a serious issue to be tried that the decision was unlawful for this reason.

Ground 3: Failure to undertake a freestanding assessment of slavery/servitude/forced or compulsory labour

The thrust of the Defendant’s decision was that the Claimant had not established reasonable grounds because of a lack of detail and a lack of consistency that were not remedied by any further evidence. I see no serious issue that the Defendant could have reached a different conclusion in relation to types of modern slavery other than trafficking.

Ground 4: Irrationality/unreasonableness

The preceding grounds do not make out a serious issue or show a lack of the necessary quality of reasoning.

Policy argument

The Claimant also made a free-standing contention that removal would be in breach of a provision of the Defendant’s guidance document Judicial reviews, injunctions and applications in relation to enforcement of immigration removal and deportation which states that “removal will always be deferred where a first challenge has been raised to a Single Competent Authority or Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority decision on a modern slavery claim”. However, the Defendant’s counsel drew my attention to a passage in the document which disapplies that guidance “where the individual is being removed under special arrangements provisions”. That being so, it seems to me that the Claimant’s contention in that regard was totally without merit.

Balance of convenience

It has not been shown that the claimant would be at real risk of immediate harm if she is returned to France. There is no evidence that if she were returned to France tomorrow he would be immediately subject to such treatment. She would be able to continue to pursue her claim from France. If it turns out that there is a properly arguably claim for judicial review, and that the claimant is at risk in France, then it would be open to her to seek an order requiring her return to the United Kingdom.

Conversely, there is a strong public interest in the Secretary of State being able to pursue her “1 in 1 out” policy unless or until it is shown to be unlawful or that, in an individual case, a return decision (or a necessary step towards making the return decision) is unlawful. If the court grants interim relief in cases where that has not been shown, then that would be injurious to the public interest. It would reduce the deterrent effect which is fundamental to the intended purpose of the policy so as to reduce large-scale unlawful and dangerous attempts to enter the United Kingdom. This militates strongly in favour of refusing interim relief.

In these circumstances, the balance of convenience strongly militates against the grant of interim relief.
It follows that even if there had been a serious issue to be tried on one or more of the grounds of claim, I would have refused interim relief.

Signed: Mr Justice Bourne
Dated: 14/04/26