August 17, 2026

HPE and IFD -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative Court High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Case numbers: AC-2025-LON-003348
AC-2025-LON-003350

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

17 August 2026

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Kimblin

Between:

The King
on the application of
(1) HPE
(2) IFD
(Claimants)

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department
(Defendant)

Order

Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimants, the Defendants’ Summary Grounds of Defence and the Claimants’ Replies

ORDER BY THE HON. MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN

Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimants names are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) the First Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as HPE;

(iii) the Second Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as IFD.

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimants or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimants in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimants;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimants, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

Permission: Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
Costs:

(a) The First Claimant must pay the Defendants’ costs in the sum of £1037.50
(b) The Second Claimant must pay the Defendants’ costs in the sum of £1037.50

Further provision as to costs:

(a) The Claimant has the benefit of cost protection for the purposes of s. 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. Accordingly:

(i) paragraph 2 specifies the maximum amount that the Claimant may be held liable to pay;

(ii) the amount of costs that the Claimant is liable to pay is to be determined on an application by the other party under regulation 16 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.

(b) If the Claimant wishes to object to the order in paragraph 2 in principle, or the maximum amount there specified, the following directions apply.

(c) Where the Claimant does not make a valid request for reconsideration of the decision to refuse permission to apply for judicial review (see notes below):

(i) Within 14 days of the date of this Order, the Claimant may file and serve a notice of objection (maximum 3 pages) showing why the order in paragraph 2 should not be made. The notice should include any objections to the principle that costs should be paid and/or as to the amount specified.

(ii) If the Claimant does not file and serve a notice of objection within that period, paragraph 2 is a final order, which specifies the maximum amount that the Claimant may be held liable to pay.

(iii) If the Claimant files and serves a notice of objection in accordance with (i) above:

the other party may, within 14 days after the date on which the notice is served, file and serve submissions in response (maximum 3 pages);
if the other party files and serves on the Claimant submissions in response, the Claimant may, within 7 days after the date on which the other party’s submissions in response are served, file and serve reply submissions (maximum 3 pages);
the Court will determine what costs order to make on the papers;
any costs ordered must be paid within 14 days of the date of the Court’s order (in accordance with CPR 44.7(1)(a)), unless the Court specifies another date.

(d) Where the Claimant makes a valid request for reconsideration (see notes below):

(i) Paragraph 2 does not become final as respects the maximum amount of the claimant’s liability to a party unless, insofar as it relates to that party:

the Claimant withdraws the application for permission; or
permission to apply for judicial review is refused on all grounds after a hearing.

(ii) If the Claimant wishes to contend that the order in paragraph 2 should not be made even if permission is refused on all grounds, the Claimant must within 14 days after the date of this Order file and serve a notice of objection (maximum 3 pages). The notice should include any objections to the principle that costs should be paid and/or as to the amount specified.

(iii) If the Claimant files and serves a notice of objection in accordance with (ii) above:

the other party may, within 14 days after the date on which the notice is served, file and serve submissions in response (maximum 3 pages);
if the other party files and serves on the Claimant submissions in response, the Claimant may, within 7 days after the date on which those submissions are served, file and serve reply submissions (maximum 3 pages);
the Court will determine what costs order to make at or after the permission hearing.

5. Renewal directions: Where the Claimant makes a valid request for reconsideration (see notes below), the following directions apply:

(a) The permission hearing is to be listed with a time estimate of 60 minutes, including submissions by the parties and an oral judgment by the judge. If the Claimant considers that more time should be allowed, the time estimate must be included with the request for reconsideration of permission.

(b) Within 21 days of the service of this Order, the Claimant must file and serve an electronic copy of the Permission Hearing Bundle, prepared in accordance with the guidance on the Administrative Court website and containing the following documents:

(i) the Claim Form, Statement of Facts and Grounds and any evidence or other documents filed with the Claim Form;

(ii) any Acknowledgment of Service, Summary Grounds of Defence and any accompanying documents served by any Defendant and/or Interested Party;

(iii) any Reply or other document served by any party to the proceedings at the paper permission stage;

(iv) this Order;

(v) the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review (on Form 86B);

(vi) any other document the Court would be likely to consider material to its decision on permission to apply for judicial review.

(c) If the Claimant fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), permission will be determined on the basis of the renewal notice and the documents before the Court at the paper stage, unless at the hearing the Court otherwise directs.

(d) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, the Claimants must file and serve:

(i) a combined skeleton argument, maximum 15 pages. i.e. a single skeleton argument which addresses both Claimants’ claims;

(ii) an electronic bundle containing any authorities which the Court needs to read at the hearing (the Authorities Bundle: see para. 22.1.2 of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide); and

(iii) if requested by the Court, a hard copy version of the Permission Hearing Bundle and Authorities Bundles.

(e) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, any party other than the Claimant intending to participate in the hearing must file and serve any skeleton argument, maximum 15 pages, on the same basis as set out at (d)(i) above.

(f) If a party fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), (d) and/or (e), the Court may have regard to the failure when considering any question about costs at the hearing.

REASONS

The Claimants and their Backgrounds

(1) The First Claimant is a journalist who worked for a radio station which presented education programmes on women’s rights. In 2009 she transferred to the BBC. She received death threats.

(2) The First Claimant’s extended family left Afghanistan when the Taliban took over in 2021. Her applications in the UK and in other jurisdictions have been unsuccessful. She was found ineligible for the ARAP scheme on 27th January 2023.

(3) The Second Claimant is in a not dissimilar position, but there are nevertheless notable differences. She too is a journalist. A particular feature of her case is her family’s opposition to her career path, and attendant problems which this caused for her mental health.

(4) These claims are a challenge to the application and implementation of the schemes and policies for relocating Afghan applicants at risk from the Taliban. The schemes are:

a. Afghan Citizens’ Resettlement Scheme (‘ACRS’)
b. Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (‘ARAP’)
c. the Afghan Resettlement and Immigration Policy Statement (‘ARIPS’)

(5) The Claimant’s grounds, as amended, are:
Ground 1 – the Defendants’ unlawful failure to honour their commitment to resettle 20,000 Afghan nationals pursuant to ACRS.
Ground 2 – excessive and disproportionate irrational delay in progressing the introduction of the second stage of pathway 3.
Ground 3 – failure to provide any reasons for the delay.
Ground 4 – breach of a legitimate expectation.
Ground 5 – irrational operation of the ACRS scheme.
Ground 6 – failure to consider the impact of the data incident by the second Defendant in the implementation of the ACRS/ARR or LOTR.
Ground 7 – breach of section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 in respect of the operation of the ACRS, the failure to implement of ACRS of Pathway 3 and/or to close the scheme.

(6) The relief sought is on the amended and consolidated SFG is:
a. A Declaration that the Defendants have acted irrationally and/or unlawfully by failing to implement Stage 2 of Pathway 3 of ACRS;
b. A Mandatory Order that the Claimants have the opportunity for their cases to be considered, whether within the ambit of the ACRS scheme as proposed or on a discretionary basis by the 1st Defendant;
c. A Declaration that the Defendants have failed to comply with their PSED duties;
d. Damages arising from the data breach occasioned by the 2nd Defendant.

Anonymity

(7) I have made orders in respect of the Claimants anonymity. In my judgment, the presumption in favour of open and transparent justice is outweighed in both Claimant’s cases by the potential risks which naming them in these proceedings would produce.

Analysis

(8) The amended SFG extend to 35 pages. They are thorough, detailed, fair and helpful. The Secretary of State’s (First Defendant) response is at a higher and more broad level. Both parties draw attention to the way in which Bourne J summarised the effect of ACRS in R(GA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 871 (Admin), particularly at [55]-[60]. That summary repays close attention.

(9) ACRS is a nuanced and complex document which addressed a complex situation on the ground and which did not purport to provide a complete answer. To the contrary, it expressly stated that it was unable to address the objectives of all of those who were likely to subscribe to it. In any event, such statements did not, and could not, give rise to a legally enforceable representation: R (MTA) v SSHD [2024] EWHC 553 (Admin) at [21] per Swift J.

(10) In this context, I am unable to accept that the Claimants have an arguable case under their ground 1. There was no commitment of the type which the Claimants seek to describe. There was, therefore, no unlawful failure to follow such commitment. In my judgment, the Claimants’ submissions under ground 1 alight on those aspects and parts of Government statements which are consistent with the Claimants’ circumstances, but leave out those elements which demonstrate that ARACS is discretionary and not a complete answer for all. Relevant public statements did not create a procedural fairness point on which the Claimants could rely.

(11) The same analysis applies to grounds 2, 3, 4 and 5. Ministerial statements did not create any public law obligation to create or open a new pathway to which the Claimants could be referred. The SFG mischaracterise the schemes and their scope. I do not consider that the dicta of Swift J in MTA provide any support to the Claimants: “A decision of this nature is self-evidently one that is political, and one for which the boundaries of legality need to be set accordingly”.

(12) Swift J recognised the inherent difficulty in decisions on who to prioritise. The inevitable consequence of prioritisation is that some, or indeed many, are not prioritised. There was no legitimate expectation as can be seen from the summary of the scheme in GA. Indeed, the expectation was the opposite – it was expected and anticipated that deserving cases would not be accommodated. The Secretary of State was not obliged to give reasons for his reasons. The rationality ground adds nothing. Grounds 2, 3, 4 and 5 are not arguable.

(13) Ground 6 is about the well-known data breach: see MoD v Global Media and Entertainment Ltd [2025] EWHC 1806 (Admin). The Claimants contend the first Defendant failed to consider the impact of the data breach on the risk to the cohort who were entitled to or who were expecting to be considered as part of ACRS when closing the scheme in relation to the grant of leave under the ARR or at all on a discretionary basis including but not limited to the First Claimant. The Claimants contends that there is an elevated risk because of the data breach.

(14) This ground is not arguable on the facts. Neither Claimant appears within the data which was disclosed during the data breach. The Second Claimant did not apply under ARAP. The First Claimant’ data were not included in the dataset. Her sister-in- law’s application for relocation referred to the First Claimant as an additional family member. These facts do not establish the error of law which the Claimants seek to rely upon. There was nothing to take into consideration in this regard.

(15) Ground 7 is based on s.149 Equality Act 2010. Given that Stage 2 of Pathway 3 was never brought about, it is not tenable to argue that there was a failure to assess its equality impacts. Ground 7 therefore has no prospects of success.

(16) Accordingly, permission to apply for judicial review is refused.

Case Management/Renewal

(17) The Claimants’ cases are very closely aligned, as the consolidated SFG shows. I have not made any order as to future case management because at this stage the cases are at an end. However, in the event that both Claimants renew their applications then I have made provision for those renewals to be heard at the same time. That is the way in which I invite the parties to deal with that scenario.

Signed: MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN
Date: 17th August 2026