IK -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtCivilHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case number: AC-2024-LON-003506

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

28 October 2024

Before:

David Pievsky KC
sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

Between:

The King
on the application of
IK

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department


Order

On an application by the Claimant for urgent consideration, interim relief, directions, and anonymity

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant on 24 October 2024

And Following an Order by Mrs Justice Collins Rice dated 25 October 2024 by which the Defendant was given until 10am on Monday 28 October 2024 to file and serve a response to the application

And upon the Claimant filing an amended Statement of Facts and Grounds at 3.53pm on Friday 25 October 2024

And upon the Defendant filing a Response at 10.31am, following a request to the Court for an extension of time until 10.30am, on Monday 28 October 2024

And upon the Claimant requesting permission to file a brief Reply to the Defendant’s response by 11.45am on Monday 28 October 2024

ORDER by David Pievsky KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge:

  1. Time is extended for the Defendant’s 28 October 2024 response to the Claimant’s application.

  2. The Claimant’s request to file a reply to that Response is also granted.

  3. The Claimant has permission to file and serve on the Amended Statement of Facts and Grounds dated 25 October 2024 which were sent to the Court on that day.

  4. The interim relief granted by Collins Rice J on 25 October 2024 shall continue. The Defendant is to ensure that the Claimant continue to receive trafficking support under the National Referral Mechanism until such time as these judicial review proceedings are determined or resolved.

  5. The interim anonymity order made by Collins Rice J on 25 October 2024 shall continue. The Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public in connection with these proceedings and is to be referred to instead as “IK”. There must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

  6. Liberty to the Defendant to apply for variation or discharge of this Order.

  7. Costs in the case.


    Reasons
  1. There is in my Judgment a serious issue to be tried, and a strong prima facie case. The Claimant has raised a number of JR Grounds – all of them cogently presented. Whilst my preliminary view is that (contrary to what the Claimant contends under Ground 1(i)) the Defendant was probably entitled to place substantial weight on the Claimant’s sexual offences, notwithstanding they occurred some time ago, I also think that the Claimant has raised a number of other (independent) points about the 4.10.22 decision, relating to both process and substance, which taken together generate a strong prima facie case. I note that the Defendant’s Response to this application (which I accept needed to be drafted quickly) does not seriously attempt to argue the contrary proposition (other than by referring to the need for a strong prima facie case / a high threshold); the Response prefers to concentrate on submissions relating to the balance of convenience.

  2. As to the balance of convenience, my conclusion is that this falls in favour of the grant of interim relief. The Claimant is at risk of being made homeless as the result of a decision which was potentially unlawful. He is vulnerable. The preservation of the status quo until the determination of these proceedings would on the face of it be the just course.

  3. The Defendant has pointed to the fact that the Claimant has separately applied under paragraphs 15.173 to 15.191 of the Modern Slavery Guidance for an extension of NRM support which is currently under consideration (an application which the Claimant is entitled to make even after a s.60(3)(b) order has been made, and on the premise that such order was lawfully made); and that he “may” also have recourse to public funds. In my Judgment, these points are by their nature too uncertain to be capable of bearing decisive weight in a proper consideration of the balance of convenience as it currently stands. Paragraphs 15.173 to 15.191 have a different, and more limited, purpose compared with the interim injunction that has been sought. If the outcome of the Claimant’s extension application (or any other material development) changes the position, such that the interim order is no longer justified, the right course is for the Defendant to have liberty to apply to make the appropriate submissions, providing the Court with a full (and up to date) explanation of those developments.

  4. I note that the Defendant does not object to the continuation of the anonymity order. The issue is one for the Court. Balancing the fundamental importance of open justice on the one hand, against the interests of the Claimant on the other (a victim of trafficking, fearing retrafficking), an anonymity order is in my judgment justified in this case.


    Signed: David Pievsky

    Date: 28 October 2024