IMW -v- Sunderland City Council (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case number: AC-2026-LDS-000034

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

1 May 2026

Before:

HH Judge Klein,
sitting as a High Court Judge

Between:

The King
on the application of
IMW

-v-

Sunderland City Council

Order

Notification of Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents filed by the Claimant, the acknowledgement of service and summary grounds of defence

ORDER BY HH JUDGE KLEIN SITTING AS A HIGH COURT JUDGE

Anonymity:

  1. Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(a) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(b) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as IMW.

  1. Pursuant to s.11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
  2. Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):

(a) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;

(b) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(c) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

  1. Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Anonymity Order (in paras.1-3 above) must make an application, served on each party.

Extension of time:

  1. The time for the filing of an acknowledgement of service is extended to 19 March 2026 (or to 23 March 2026, if, in fact, an acknowledgment of service was filed on that later date) (and, to this extent, if necessary, relief from sanctions is granted).

Permission and Transfer

  1. The Claimant is granted permission to apply for judicial review.
  2. Pursuant to s.31A(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the claim is transferred to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).

Interim relief

  1. Until the final determination of the claim or further order in the meantime, the Defendant must treat the Claimant in accordance with the Claimant’s claimed age and, within a reasonable time, must provide the Claimant with support in accordance with the Children Act 1989.

Further order

  1. Any party affected by paragraph 5 of this order may apply to have it set aside, varied or stayed. Any such application must be made not more than 7 days after the date on which this order is served on the party making the application.

OBSERVATIONS AND REASONS

(1) Anonymity: The Home Office’s Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority has made a conclusive grounds decision that the Claimant is a child victim of human trafficking/modern slavery. The Claimant has made out a sufficient case to be entitled to anonymity under s.2(1)(db) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 and/or, in any event, there are compelling reasons on the facts of this case for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice provided for by this order.

(2) Extension of time: In this case, strictly the Defendant has not filed an acknowledgment of service. One has in fact been filed by Together for Children (Sunderland) CIC (“TFC”), on 19 March 2026, although TFC is not a party to the claim. It has applied for an extension of time to file an acknowledgment of service. Because it is not a party, strictly it does not need an extension of time to file an acknowledgment of service. However, if it is appropriate for an extension of time to be granted, I should do so on my own initiative, to avoid unnecessary procedural complications, albeit that the parties will need to urgently consider the correct identity of the parties and ought to file a draft signed consent order to regularise the position. One week’s delay (or thereabouts) in the filing of an acknowledgment of service is not significant, because such a delay has in fact had no impact on the proceedings. In any event, all the circumstances of the case support an extension. It is helpful for the court and the Claimant to know (as the Claimant accepts in their Statement of Facts and Grounds) what the substantive response to the claim is, or is likely to be. It is, in any event, consistent with the overriding objective for me to grant an extension of time, so that the permission application can be determined most fairly.

(3) Permission: The threshold for permission in an age assessment case is low. Permission must be given if a claimant’s factual case, taken at its highest, can properly succeed in a contested factual hearing. It is effectively accepted in the Summary Grounds of Resistance, at para.18, that the Claimant has met that threshold and that permission should be given. Having considered the Statement of Facts and Grounds, for the reasons set out there, I agree. It is also appropriate, consistent with the decision in FZ v. LB of Croydon, to transfer the claim to the UT(IAC).

(4) Interim relief: There is no objection to the form of interim relief sought, if interim relief is granted. There is an objection, however, to the grant of interim relief, on the ground that, if it turns out that interim relief was wrongly granted because the Claimant was an adult at the relevant date(s), expense will have been irrecoverably incurred inappropriately. I have borne in mind that point. On the other hand, if it turns out that the Claimant should have been treated, pending the final determination of the claim, as a former child and no interim relief is granted, they are likely to have suffered a detriment. I have had to determine what is the course which appears to offer the best prospect of eventual injustice being avoided or minimised (see R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.2) [1991] 1 AC 603, 659). TFC’s age assessment gives the Claimant the age of 21. Even on its case, therefore, the Claimant is only a young adult. At most, the Claimant apparently only has a limited facility with the English language and there has been a determination that they are a child victim of human trafficking/modern slavery. I am satisfied, albeit just, that it is appropriate to grant the interim relief sought taking into account all these matters. I have ordered that the Defendant must provide the Claimant with support within a reasonable time, rather than “as soon as practicable”. The interim relief sought, and granted, is somewhat non-specific in its terms. Bearing in mind the particular circumstances of this case, to require the Defendant to take somewhat non-specific steps “as soon as practicable” may place an inappropriate burden on it. By the order made, it is still required to act within a reasonable time.

Signed: HH Judge Klein
Date: 1/5/26