September 12, 2025

JEY -v- South Tyneside Council (anonymity order)

Administrative Court High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-LDS-000084

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

12 September 2025

Before:

DHCJ Alan Bates
sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court

Between:

The King
on the application of
JEY (whose name has been anonymised by the Court)
(Claimant)

-v-

South Tyneside Council
(Defendant)

and

BUB (a child whose name has been anonymised by the Court)
(Interested Party)

Order

Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 23.12, 54.11, 54.12)

PENAL NOTICE

ANY PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DISOBEYS PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ORDER OR DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS ANY PERSON TO WHOM THIS ORDER APPLIES TO BREACH THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ORDER MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE IMPRISONED, FINED OR HAVE THEIR ASSETS SEIZED.

Following consideration of documents lodged by the Claimant, and the Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence (and no Acknowledgement of Service having been filed on behalf of the Interested Party, who is a child)

ORDER BY ALAN BATES,
SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Anonymity and reporting restrictions for protecting the privacy and welfare of the Interested Party (who is a child), and restriction of access to the court file:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the names of the Claimant, the Interested Party, and any parent of the Interested Party (whether alive or deceased), are all to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed at any hearing in these proceedings held in public; and

(ii) in any further documents filed in these proceedings, and at any hearing held in public, the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as “JEY”, and the Interested Party is to be referred to orally and in writing as “BUB”.

(b) Pursuant to section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and/or section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, there must be no publication of the identity of the Interested Party, the Claimant, or any parent of the Interested Party (alive or deceased), of the name of any school attended by the Interested Party, or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Interested Party in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings. (For the avoidance of doubt, the meaning of the term “publication” includes, but is not limited to, posting information on any social media platform or website which is accessible to, or sent to, the public or a section of the public.)

(i) No non-party many obtain a copy of any statement of case or other document from the court’s file relating to these proceedings, save with the prior permission of a High Court Judge.

(ii) Any application by a non-party for access to documents on the court file must be made by way of an Application Notice pursuant to CPR 5.4C(6), giving at least 7 days’ notice to the Defendant.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge paragraph 1 of this Order must make an application by way of an Application Notice, served on the Claimant and the Defendant.

Permission to apply for judicial review:

(a) Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.

(b) The application is certified as totally without merit.

Costs: No order as to costs.

REASONS

Factual background

(1) These proceedings relate to the Defendant local authority’s exercise of its corporate parental responsibility for the Interested Party, BUB. BUB is an 11-year-old child who is the subject of a Care Order made by the Family Court. Pursuant to that Care Order, the Defendant authority has parental responsibility for BUB and shares that parental responsibility with BUB’s mother (by birth). Sadly, BUB’s father is deceased.

(2) The Claimant is BUB’s paternal grandmother. She does not hold parental responsibility for BUB, and nor does BUB live with her. She provided accommodation and care for BUB for a significant period of time in the past, and BUB’s spend time with her on around one weekend every fortnight.

(3) BUB’s biological sex is male but BUB has, for a number of years, been wishing to present as a girl and to dress in clothes typically worn by girls. The Claimant’s judicial review claim essentially challenges the Defendant authority’s approach to managing this situation; an approach which she claims is unlawful. In particular, the Claimant challenges the authority for facilitating and supporting BUB in presenting and dressing as a girl. The Claimant also asserts that the Defendant has “compelled” BUB to receive counselling from a Gender Identity Development Service and may be laying the ground for BUB to fully transition to living as a female. The Claimant also complains that the Defendant is breaching her human rights by not consulting her in relation to its decision-making, including as to how best to respond to BUB’s apparent desire to present as a girl.

Anonymity and reporting restrictions

(4) The Claimant has included BUB’s name in the documents filed in support of the claim but has not included in the claim form any application for anonymisation (whether of BUB or herself). This is surprising, given that the Claimant has had the assistance of solicitors and Counsel. These proceedings pertain to highly sensitive and personal matters relating to an 11-year-old child who has already experienced a high level of childhood trauma. Further, the claim bundle includes copies of Orders made by the Family Court in Children Act proceedings held in private.

(5) In my view, there is a real risk that any publicity relating to these proceedings which enabled the identity of BUB to become known (whether widely, or even to small numbers of people who know BUB personally, such as school classmates) could cause significant distress and emotional harm to BUB. I have therefore included in my Order provisions for protecting BUB against that risk. I have placed a Penal Notice on this Order to reinforce the importance this Court attaches to protecting BUB’s privacy interests.

Assessment of the merits or otherwise of the claim

(6) In considering the Claimant’s grounds of challenge, I bear in mind the complex reality of the situation with which the Defendant, as BUB’s corporate parent, is having to deal. BUB is a highly vulnerable child who has experienced a great deal of trauma and instability. Such psychological assessments as have been made of BUB suggest, perhaps unsurprisingly, that BUB’s insistence on self-identifying as a girl may be attributable to a deep need to assume a separate identity from the younger (male) self who experienced a high level of trauma. BUB’s situation as a whole – including, but not only, BUB’s preference for presenting and dressing as a girl – plainly needs to be managed with sensitivity, wisdom and compassion.

(7) The duty to ensure this is done is primarily that of the Defendant authority, in addition to BUB’s mother (who, as noted above, also holds parental responsibility). The social workers employed with the Defendant must, in my view, be afforded some space in which to make professional judgements as to how BUB is supported, provided that those judgements are not irrational or contrary to medical advice. Those professionals are the people likely to be best placed to understand and assess BUB’s complex needs. The Administrative Court will be slow to intervene: this Court is not well-placed to ‘second-guess’ difficult judgements made by local authority social workers about how best to support a child with complex needs.

(8) For the following reasons, I am satisfied that none of the Claimant’s three grounds for judicial review claim has a realistic prospect of success:-

(9) Ground 1 is that the Defendant’s ‘failure’ to consult with the Claimant regarding the care provided for BUB is a breach of the Claimant’s Article 8 Convention Right to family life (as provided for in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998). I am satisfied that this Ground does not have a realistic prospect of success. In that regard:

(a) Whilst I accept that the relationship between a grandparent and her grandchild (and also other extended family relationships, such as between siblings, cousins, etc.) is a form of ‘family life’ qualifying for respect pursuant to Article 8, it does not follow that a local authority is required to consult extended family members when making decisions about the care and support to be provided to a child in respect of whom the authority holds parental responsibility. A grandparent’s familial relationship with her grandchild would not ordinarily entail an expectation that the persons having parental responsibility for the child would consult the grandparent before taking such decisions.

(b) The Claimant’s (qualified) right to family life with BUB can be, and is being, respected by enabling the Claimant regularly to spend time with BUB. The Claimant’s ability to enjoy a relationship with BUB, as a loving grandparent, is not arguably being infringed by the local authority’s ‘failure’ to consult the Claimant about how to manage BUB’s desire to present and dress as a girl.

(c) Like a typical parent, a local authority corporate parent will often choose to have some regard to the views of people who do not have parental responsibility but are nevertheless important people in the child’s life. Ultimately, however, the decision-making responsibility rests with the holders of parental responsibility. Those people need to exercise that responsibility guided by what they consider to be in the child’s welfare interests, based on their own observations of the child, sometimes informed by professional advice. Where a child is experiencing complex mental or emotional difficulties, it is unlikely to be unreasonable for the authority to consider that it should be guided by the professional judgements of its social workers, and will not be significantly assisted by seeking the personal opinions of multiple other people.

(d) In any event, the Defendant is aware of the Claimant’s views regarding the care to be provided for BUB, such as that BUB should be discouraged from presenting and dressing as a girl. The Claimant’s real complaint is that her views have not been adopted by the Defendant. However, the Defendant was bound to exercise its own judgement as BUB’s corporate parent, treating BUB’s welfare as the paramount consideration. Article 8 cannot arguably require a child’s corporate parent to adopt or follow the non-expert personal opinions of a member of the child’s extended family who does not have parental responsibility. It is a matter for the authority what weight, if any, to give to such opinions.

(e) Paragraph 29 of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds asserts that section 22(4) of the Children Act 1989 requires local authorities to “ascertain the wishes of relevant stakeholders” before taking decisions about a child in the authority’s care. However, section 22(4) enumerates the specific categories of persons whose wishes the authority is required to ascertain. Those categories include all persons with parental responsibility; but the Claimant does not hold parental responsibility for BUB. There is also a residual category for “any other person whose wishes and feelings the authority consider to be relevant” (emphasis supplied); but that category affords the authority a discretion in relation to the identification of such persons (and may vary depending on the nature of the decision being taken). The Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds does not plead any reasoned case that the Defendant’s failure to do more to ascertain her views was irrational.

(10) Ground 2 is that “the Defendant has and continues to engage in an abuse of process by failing to consult with the Claimant concerning any significant decisions concerning [BUB], forcing him to engage in a gender transitioning process and is therefore acting ultra vires”. I am satisfied that this Ground does not have a realistic prospect of success. In that regard:

(a) The matters raised by the Claimant in support of this Ground include the Defendant’s ‘failure’ to provide her with copies of a clinical psychologist’s report and other documents relating to assessments made of BUB. However, I see no basis on which such alleged ‘failure’ could be found by this Court to have been unlawful. As the Claimant does not have parental responsibility for BUB, she has no right to access BUB’s confidential medical records.

(b) A further complaint is that the defendant has allowed or caused BUB to consult with a GP about, or to be put on a waiting list for, or to be provided with, “gender counselling”, and that this has been done against BUB’s own wishes. However, apart from the Claimant’s assertions, there appears to be no evidence that BUB has been provided with counselling directed at potentially supporting a transition to living life as a girl/woman. In any event, the Defendant, as BUB’s corporate parent, is entitled to make judgements as to the medical care, including any counselling, BUB should receive, taking account of any relevant guidance from BUB’s GP or other medical professionals, provided that those judgements are not irrational. There is no prospect of the Claimant establishing that the Defendant’s judgements are irrational, absent evidence showing that those judgements are incompatible with all relevant respectable schools of medical opinion.

(c) The Claimant accuses the Defendant of subjecting BUB to “social transitioning practices” and providing support for BUB’s wish to dress as a girl and use female pronouns, which (she asserts) BUB will perceive as “encouragement” and “will therefore hasten his trajectory into gender reassignment practices”. The Claimant asserts that this conduct by the Defendant is unlawful as there is “no legal basis in the United Kingdom to attribute transgender status to a child as young as [BUB].” But these arguments lack any real grounding in the situational reality. Aside from the Claimant’s assertions, there is no evidence that the Defendant is doing anything specifically to encourage or induce BUB to self-identify as a girl. There is no factual basis for contending that the authority has placed BUB on a structured programme (whether formal or informal) directed at an outcome whereby BUB lives life as a girl/woman. Nor is there any factual basis for contending that the authority has attributed “transgender status” to BUB.

(d) Rather, the authority is having to deal with a difficult complex situation in which BUB has, for a very considerable period, been persistent in her wish to present and dress as a girl. This may well be a response to past experiences of childhood trauma. How best to respond to this situation is a matter of professional judgement on which the Court will be slow to intrude. It is not arguably unlawful for the Defendant to take the view that the best approach is, at the present time, to compassionately support BUB’s current choices as to clothing, hairstyle, pronouns, etc., rather than seeking to challenge or reject her choices. Nor is it arguably unlawful for the Defendant to seek counselling or other therapies for BUB which are directed, not at ‘changing gender’, but at helping BUB to navigate the difficult process of understanding one’s own identity (something with which many children struggle, but which may be especially painful for BUB because of deep emotional scars of the past).

(e) The case-law referenced by the Claimant is inapposite. As set out above, BUB is not being referred to, or treated by, a Gender Identity Development Service: BUB is not even of the appropriate age for a referral to such a service. Nor does the Defendant have any plans to consent to BUB being given any hormone therapy or other medical treatment for limiting the development of physical characteristics typically associated with males. Rather, as noted above, the Defendant is supporting BUB to present and dress in the way BUB is currently choosing. BUB’s choices in that regard may change with the passage of time (including the onset of puberty), or they may not: time will tell. It is not arguably unlawful for the Defendant to seek to support BUB’s current choices for the time being, rather than seeking to challenge or change those choices: this is a matter for the judgement of the professionals who know BUB, and not for this Court.

(11) Ground 3 is that “the transgender affirming care of [BUB] unfairly and/or unlawfully interferes with the Claimant’s Article 8, 9 +10 and 14 rights not to be compelled to treat [BUB] as transgendered”. I am satisfied that this Ground does not have a realistic prospect of success. In that regard:

(a) As set out above, the evidence does not support the Claimant’s assertions that the Defendant is “encouraging” BUB to transition to “transgender identity”. Rather, the Defendant is simply supporting BUB’s current choices as to how she presents and dresses for the time being.

(b) The Defendant’s willingness to accept and support BUB’s choices to present and dress as a girl, and to be referred to using female pronouns, plainly does not itself arguably infringe any of the Claimant’s Convention Rights. It is not arguable that the Defendant is thereby restricting the Claimant’s ability to maintain or express her own religious or other beliefs.

(c) Moreover, even if (quod non) the Defendant’s approach gave rise to any interference with the Claimant’s Convention Rights, that interference would be amply justified by the need to balance those rights with BUB rights. When the Defendant is considering how best to support BUB in relation to BUB’s sense of identity, the Defendant’s focus should be on making a judgement as to the approach that is most likely to succeed in furthering BUB’s welfare. In doing so, the Convention Rights to which the Defendant would need to afford substantial weight are those of BUB, consistently with BUB’s personal autonomy. It is wholly unrealistic, and legally wrong, to suppose that the Defendant’s focus on BUB’s welfare should be outweighed, or diluted, by any supposed Convention Right of the Claimant.

(d) The Claimant may be right that, if she were to insist on refusing to treat BUB as a girl (by, for example, ignoring requests from BUB to be called by female pronouns) and this caused BUB to feel upset or angry, then it is possible that either the local authority or BUB might seek to restrict or reduce the Claimant’s visits to, or other contact with, BUB. But the true operative cause of any such restriction or reduction would be, not the Defendant’s support for BUB’s current choices, but the Claimant’s insensitivity or inflexibility in terms of what she said or did in response to those choices.

(e) I hope, and expect, that the Claimant will seek to respond with empathy, sensitivity and compassion to her grandchild’s requests, regardless of her own personal views, beliefs or preferences. Her witness statement speaks of how she, as a Christian, seeks to treat all people with love. She will surely recognise that BUB’s welfare, and her relationship with BUB, would not be assisted by her ignoring or undermining the ‘acceptance not challenge’ approach that the Defendant (as BUB’s corporate parent) has decided to take for supporting BUB at this time. If the Claimant does not do so, then any Article 8 protected right she may have to spend time with BUB may be outweighed by the need to protect BUB from emotional harm.

(12) Further to the above analysis of the Claimant’s grounds of challenge, I am satisfied that the judicial review claim is totally without merit. It is advanced based largely on assertions, not supported by any other evidence and denied by the Defendant, that BUB is receiving “gender identity counselling” and/or has been referred to a Gender Identity Development Service. The claim also seeks to misrepresent the Defendant’s approach of seeking to support (rather than challenge or confront) BUB’s current choices as to how she presents and dresses as being tantamount to actively encouraging BUB to transition to female gender. Further, the claim is hopelessly focused on the Claimant’s Convention Rights, with little or no recognition of the need for the Defendant to give primacy to BUB’s Convention Rights when it is taking decisions relating to BUB’s welfare and sense of personal identity.

Further matters I would have needed to consider had any of the grounds of challenge had a realistic prospect of success

(13) Had I decided that any of the grounds of challenge had a realistic prospect of success, I would have needed to consider: (a) whether BUB’s mother should have been served as an Interested Party, given that she shares parental responsibility for BUB; and (b) whether and how BUB (whom the Claimant has identified as an Interested Party) should be served with the claim, and/or permitted to participate in the proceedings, potentially by the appointment of a litigation friend pursuant to CPR Part 21.

(14) I would also have needed to consider whether this Court is the proper forum for determining the issues raised in these proceedings, or whether those issues ought properly to have been brought by way of proceedings in the Family Court, or whether these proceedings could and should be transferred to the Family Division of the High Court.

(15) Costs: Although the Defendant has filed an Acknowledgement of Service, it does not include any request for the Claimant to be ordered to pay the costs of the same. Therefore, I make no order for costs.

(16) Decision on whether to make a civil restraint order (CPR rule 23.12): I have considered whether to make a civil restraint order against the Claimant but have decided it is not proportionate to do so at this time. I have no information before me which indicates any repetition or pattern of conduct by the Claimant in bringing unmeritorious court proceedings.

Signed: DHCJ Alan Bates
Date: 5th August 2025

CPR 54.12(7) APPLIES. ACCORDINGLY, THE CLAIMANT MAY NOT REQUEST RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION TO REFUSE PERMISSION TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AT A HEARING.