KAAK -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2024-LON-001242

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

12 April 2024


The Honourable Mr Justice Sheldon


The King on the application of


Secretary of State for the Home Department


On the Claimant’s application for urgent consideration and interim relief
Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant

ORDER by the Honourable Mr Justice Sheldon

1. The Defendant must move the Claimant to single occupancy accommodation forthwith.

2. The Defendant has liberty to apply to vary or discharge the order at paragraph 1 above on 2 days written notice to the Claimant.

3. Any application made under paragraph 2 is to be referred to a High Court judge for consideration within one day after issue.

4. Pursuant to CPR r.39.2, in any report of these proceedings, there shall be no publication of the name and address of the Claimant, nor any other particulars likely to lead to his identification. In the proceedings, the Claimant shall be anonymised and referred to as “KAAK”.

5. No later than 14 days from the date of this order, the Claimant’s solicitors shall file with the Court copies of case documents which have been anonymised and/or redacted to protect the identity of the Claimant, in accordance with paragraph 4 above.

6. Non-parties may not obtain any documents from the court file which have not been anonymised and/or redacted to protect the identity of the Claimant, in accordance with paragraph 4 above.

7. Costs reserved.

This is a mandatory injunction. Breach of paragraph 1 of this order may give rise to contempt proceedings. Even if an application has been made under paragraph 2 to vary or discharge, the order at paragraph 1 must be complied with unless or until such an order is made.


1. The Claimant has made an application for urgent interim relief. The evidence indicates that he is an incredibly vulnerable individual: the survivor of torture, the victim of male rape as a child, and a person who suffers considerable trauma. He is receiving regular treatment from the organisation Freedom from Torture, which is attested to by a Clinical Psychologist who has been working with him, Dr Chloe Gibbons. In these circumstances, an anonymity order has been requested and I direct that it be made in the terms expressed above.

2. The claim for interim relief concerns the accommodation in which the Defendant has very recently placed the Claimant pursuant to his powers under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”). It is contended that placing the Claimant in shared hotel accommodation with another man with whom he is not familiar, who speaks a different language, practises a different religion, and has different sleeping patterns is wholly unsuitable for the Claimant. There is clear evidence to support this contention. Dr Gibbons has written to say

“It is my professional opinion that his recent move into temporary, shared accommodation has led to a significant increase in the distress he experiences and a deterioration in his mental health, which is likely to become more significant the longer he spends in this environment. It is unlikely that he will be in a stable enough position to continue engaging meaningfully with the trauma-focused therapy that we have begun, or that his mental health and wellbeing will improve, unless he feels sufficiently safe in his accommodation. Without this I would feel increasingly concerned for his mental health and his safety.”

This opinion is based on Dr Gibbons’ weekly treatment sessions with the Claimant, and what he has told her about the accommodation that he was moved to on 9 April 2024. Before his move, the Claimant had resided in single occupancy accommodation at a different hotel.

3. It is also contended that the decision to move the Claimant into the shared accommodation was not preceded by a specific analysis and understanding of the Claimant’s background and medical condition.

4. In my judgment, an interim mandatory order is required to be made in these circumstances. There is a strongly arguable case that the Claimant has been placed in totally unsuitable accommodation, and that his placement was made without proper consideration of his particular circumstances in breach of the Tameside principle.

5. The Claimant has acted very promptly in seeking to address this matter with the accommodation provider, and subsequently with solicitors for the Defendant. No response has been forthcoming from the Defendant, and the circumstances are sufficiently urgent that I cannot wait for a response before making a decision.

6. The balance of convenience plainly favours the grant of the interim relief: there is a very real risk of serious harm to the Claimant if he is not provided with single occupancy accommodation forthwith. This will no doubt cause some prejudice to the Defendant, given the limited resources available to him and in light of the considerable pressures of providing accommodation under the 1999 Act. Nevertheless, that prejudice is outweighed by the harm that may be caused to the Claimant if the relief sought is not granted.

7. The Defendant has familiarity with the Claimant’s situation as a result of previous correspondence involving a proposed move of the Claimant to the Bibby Stockholm Barge last year. The Defendant ought therefore to be in a position to take stock of the situation quickly and either make an application to vary or discharge this order (if appropriate) or to resolve matters without recourse to further proceedings. I do not list an oral hearing for continuing of the interim relief, but this does not preclude the Defendant from asking for that as part of an application to vary or discharge this order.