April 30, 2026

KPA and KTH -v- Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman (anonymity order)

Administrative Court High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-LON-004726

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

29 April 2026

Before:

Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC,
sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court

Between:

KPA
and
KTH
(by their litigation friend, KTN)

-v-

Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman

Order

Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

UPON consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant, the Defendant’s Summary Grounds of Defence, the Claimant’s Reply and the further correspondence received by the Court from the parties;

AND UPON consideration of the Claimants’ application for permission to apply for judicial review of 5 January 2026, and the decision of the Defendant dated 8 September 2025;

AND UPON consideration of the Claimants’ application to amend their Statement of Facts and Grounds;

AND UPON consideration of the Defendant’s informal request for the Claim not to be considered made by a letter dated 18 March 2026;

AND UPON the Defendant agreeing to withdraw the decision dated 8 September 2025;

AND UPON the Defendant agreeing to reconsider the Claimants’ original complaint of 13 June 2024 in line with the Defendant’s legal obligations and guidance;

AND UPON consideration of the Defendant’s open correspondence suggesting that the Claimants should withdraw their claim and the Defendant’s reasons for the decision to reconsider the decision of 8 September 2025, set out in the schedule to the draft consent order prepared by the Defendant;

AND UPON the Interested Party taking no part in these proceedings;

AND UPON the Court considering anonymity.

ORDER BY BENJAMIN DOUGLAS-JONES KC,
SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimants’ names is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) the Claimants are to be referred to orally and in writing as KPA and KTH;

(iii) the Claimants’ litigation friend is to be referred to as KTN.

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimants or their litigation friend or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimants or their litigation friend in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

Claimants’ application to amend their Statement of Facts and Grounds: The Claimants’ application of 6 February 2026 is refused.
Defendant’s informal request for the Claim not to be considered: the Defendant’s informal request made by a letter dated 18 March 2026 that no permission decision be made in this claim until the Defendant has considered a separate claim for permission to apply for judicial review, made by the Claimant in respect of the conduct of the London Borough of Greenwich, is refused.
Permission: Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
Costs: There shall be no order as to costs.
Renewal directions: Where the Claimants make a valid request for reconsideration (see notes below), the following directions apply:

(a) The permission hearing is to be listed with a time estimate of 30 minutes, including submissions by the parties and an oral judgment by the judge. If the Claimants consider that more time should be allowed, the time estimate must be included with the request for reconsideration of permission.

(b) Within 21 days of the service of this Order, the Claimants must file and serve an electronic copy of the Permission Hearing Bundle, prepared in accordance with the guidance on the Administrative Court website and containing the following documents:

(i) the Claim Form, Statement of Facts and Grounds and any evidence or other documents filed with the Claim Form;

(ii) any Acknowledgment of Service, Summary Grounds of Defence and any accompanying documents served by any Defendant and/or Interested Party;

(iii) any Reply or other document served by any party to the proceedings at the paper permission stage;

(iv) this Order;

(v) the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review (on Form 86B);

(vi) any other document the Court would be likely to consider material to its decision on permission to apply for judicial review.

(c) If the Claimants fail to comply with sub-paragraph (b), permission will be determined on the basis of the renewal notice and the documents before the Court at the paper stage, unless at the hearing the Court otherwise directs.

(d) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, the Claimants must file and serve:

(i) a skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages;

(ii) an electronic bundle containing any authorities which the Court needs to read at the hearing (the Authorities Bundle: see para. 22.1.2 of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide); and

(iii) if requested by the Court, a hard copy version of the Permission Hearing Bundle and Authorities Bundles.

(e) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, any party other than the Claimants intending to participate in the hearing must file and serve any skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages.

(f) If a party fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), (d) and/or (e), the Court may have regard to the failure when considering any question about costs at the hearing.

REASONS

(1) Anonymity: The Claimants are children. The claim relies on personal medical information in which the Claimants have a reasonable expectation of privacy. There are accordingly compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice in paragraph 1.

(2) The Claim and related application and request: The Defendant, the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman (“the Ombudsman”) investigated the Royal Borough of Greenwich’s (“the Council’s”) handling of the Claimants’ housing allocation. She issued her final decision on 8 September 2025. She found “fault causing injustice” for several instances of maladministration. The Council delayed awarding and backdating medical priority to June 2021; it provided conflicting and incorrect information about the Claimants’ bedroom entitlement and priority registration date; and it mishandled their complaint by delaying responses and failing to escalate matters appropriately.

(3) The Ombudsman concluded these faults did not cause the Claimants to miss out on a four-bedroom property. She accepted the Council’s assertion that its July 2023 letter misstated the 2021 medical evidence. The medical adviser had not recommended a separate bedroom for the youngest daughter. Consequently, the family only qualified for a four-bedroom property in December 2024, when their middle daughter turned sixteen. Furthermore, the Ombudsman reviewed allocation data and found the Council had allocated all relevant four-bedroom properties to applicants with higher priority or earlier registration dates.

(4) The Ombudsman did find the Council’s delay caused the Claimants to miss an opportunity to secure a more suitable three-bedroom property. She also acknowledged the Claimants suffered distress, frustration and uncertainty.

(5) The Ombudsman dismissed claims of discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. She noted the allocations scheme adequately accommodates mental health needs. She refused to recommend a direct housing offer. Instead, she recommended the Council apologise; pay the Claimants £750; refer the family’s case to a case review panel to consider whether to award additional priority; review its complaints policy; put in place a process to ensure proper management of complaints so where a delay occurs it is identified and acted on; and remind officers dealing with medical assessments of:

a) the need to ensure a note is kept of the date from which medical priority applies; and
b) the need to check previous correspondence when dealing with requests for review or complaints.

(6) The Council was to provide the Ombudsman with evidence it had complied with the above actions.

(7) The Defendant has agreed to reconsider its decision. The Claim is rendered academic. Where a claim is academic, i.e. there is no longer a case to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties to the claim (see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Salem [1999] 1 AC 450), it will generally not be appropriate to bring judicial review proceedings. An express example cited in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 at 6.3.4.1 is the situation, as here, where a defendant has agreed to reconsider the decision challenged. I refuse permission on this ground.

(8) Had the Claim not been academic and had I considered the merits of the application for permission to apply for judicial review, I would have refused permission to apply for the reasons I set out below.

(9) The Claimants seek permission to challenge the decision on five grounds.

(10) I need to consider Ground 2 before Ground 1, as Ground 2 provides the foundation for Ground 1. I agree with the Defendant’s submission in respect of Ground 2:

“There is no basis for the assertion that the Council is prevented by the [Housing Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”)] or the Allocation Scheme from correcting the error in the July Decision. The Claimants’ argument is undermined by the fact they do not contend that the Stage 1 Response had no power to revise the priority date to 7 June 2021.”

(11) The Council is entitled to correct mistakes; see R(oAo HBY and HBL) v Hackney, LBC (Administrative Court) (AC-2025-LON-002132) 24 April 2025, where this issue was considered in the context of Hackney’s allocations policy and the 1996 Act. Accordingly, Ground 2 is not arguable.

(12) Ground 2 is the Claimants’ challenge to the Ombudsman’s decision on the underlying principle of law. Ground 1 engages with the Claimants’ assertion that the Council was functus. Ground 1 is framed as follows. In July 2023, the Council’s Case Review Panel issued an expressly final decision granting the family backdated eligibility for a four- bedroom property. In September 2024, the local authority reversed the decision on the ground of mistake.

(13) The Claimants asserted this reversal was unlawful, relying on R (Piffs Elm Ltd) v Commission for Local Administration in England [2023] EWCA Civ 486, the authority for a statutory body being functus and lacking the jurisdiction to remake a decision.

(14) In the Ombudsman’s covering letter of 8 September 2025, she stated:

“The legal precedent you refer to though is based on the Ombudsman’s powers under the Local Government Act 1974 and, specifically, whether that legislation gave the Ombudsman the power to withdraw a public report once it had been issued. It is therefore about a separate and specific report process.”

(15) The Claimants assert that the Ombudsman acted ultra vires by making a binding legal determination on the scope of Court of Appeal precedent.

(16) It follows from what I have held in respect of Ground 2 that Ground 1 is not arguable: it is not arguable that the Ombudsman was not entitled to make the finding she did, even if it was predicated on her distinguishing the facts of this case from those of Piffs Elm.

(17) Therefore neither Ground 1 nor Ground 2 is arguable.

(18) Further and in any event in respect of Grounds 1 and 2, the Ombudsman’s interpretation of the law was correct in my judgment, so it is appropriate to consider s.31(3C) and (3D) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“the 1981 Act”) in this context:

(3C) When considering whether to grant leave to make an application for judicial review, the High Court—
(a) may of its own motion consider whether the outcome for the applicant would have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred, and
(b) must consider that question if the defendant asks it to do so.
(3D) If, on considering that question, it appears to the High Court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different, the court must refuse to grant leave.

(19) I would have further refused permission on Grounds 1 and 2 on the ground that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different.

(20) As to Ground 3, in my judgement, the Ombudsman rationally concluded the July 2023 letter was incorrect and did not reflect an underlying formal decision. In any event, I would refuse permission on the ground that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different; see s.31(3D) of the 1981 Act (above).

(21) Ground 4: I agree with the Defendant- this ground is a mere disagreement with the Ombudsman’s substantive findings. The Ombudsman lawfully evaluated the Allocations Scheme and found no discriminatory approach. She also properly considered the impact on the Claimants by recommending a referral to the case review panel. This is unarguable.

(22) Ground 5: the challenge that the investigation was not adequate is not arguable. The Ombudsman analysed a detailed list of all four-bedroom properties allocated since August 2022. She rationally concluded – on the information provided to her by the Council that the Claimants’ FOI data did not highlight any inaccuracies or alter the fact that all relevant properties went to applicants with higher priority.

(23) I have considered the Claimants’ application of 6 February 2026 to amend the Statement of Facts and Grounds based on new material revealed to the Claimants by the Council by a letter dated 3 February 2026 (“the 3 February 2026 letter”). I refuse the application to amend the Claim for permission to apply for judicial review because the matters raised there do not give rise to any arguable challenge in respect of the Ombudsman’s decision of 8 September 2025. Separately, they might give rise to grounds for a complaint to the Council and, depending on the outcome of that complaint, a further complaint to the Ombudsman. Indeed, the Ombudsman has said that she will reconsider the Claimants’ case. In any event, the Claimants have not exhausted their remedies in respect of the matters raised in the application of 6 February 2026; see the Judicial Review Guide 2025 at 6.3.3. I further refuse permission for this reason.

(24) By a letter of 18 March 2026, Messrs Kingsley Napley, on behalf of the Ombudsman, had requested that no permission decision be made in this claim, as the Ombudsman understands that a judicial review claim has been issued against and served on the Council stemming from the material referred to in the 3 February 2026 letter. That other proceedings have been issued and that the Ombudsman has said that it will reconsider its decision underscores that the Claimants have not exhausted their remedies. No formal application has been made by the Ombudsman, although this request has been overtaken by events because of the Ombudsman’s agreement to reconsider the decision. The Claimants oppose the application. In so far as it is pursued, I decline to grant it.

(25) Applying CPR 44.2, I do not think it appropriate to order the Claimants to pay the Defendant’s costs in the circumstances of this case. There will be no order as to costs.

Signed: Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC
Date: 29 April 2025