June 25, 2026

LLM and others -v- Milton Keynes City Council (anonymity order)

Administrative Court High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Case number: AC-2026-LON-002911

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

24 June 2026

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Sweeting

Between:

The King
on the application of
(1) LLM
(2) LLH
(3) LGO
(a protected party, by LLM, his litigation friend)
(4) LTH
(a protected party, by LLM, his litigation friend)
(5) Paratus Partners Ltd
(Claimants)

-v-

Milton Keynes City Council
(Defendant)

Order

On an application by the Claimants for urgent consideration, interim relief and directions, including a direction as to anonymity

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and the Defendant’s position paper

ORDER by the Hon. Mr Justice Sweeting

Anonymity:

(a) Under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and pursuant to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimant’s name are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) The First to Fourth Claimants are to be referred to orally and in writing as LLM, LLH, LGO and LTH respectively.

(iii) The full names and addresses of LLM, LLH, LGO and LTH, and the full address of the Property, shall be set out in the Confidential Schedule of Identities and Address filed with the Court and served on the Defendant.

(iv) Until further order, the address of the property identified in the Confidential Schedule of Identities and Address shall be referred to in these proceedings only as “the Property”.

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimants or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimants in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(i) the parties must within 7 days file and serve a redacted copy of any statement of case already filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimants;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time and must then be served with the unredacted version;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

Prohibitory injunction:

(a) Until further order, the Defendant shall not prosecute LLM, LLH or Paratus Partners Ltd for any alleged non-compliance with the statutory nuisance abatement notices dated 30 March 2026.

(b) Until further order, the Defendant shall not commence proceedings under section 81(5) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, take direct enforcement action, or otherwise take any step to enforce or rely upon alleged non- compliance with the statutory nuisance abatement notices dated 30 March 2026.

(c) Nothing in this order shall prevent the Defendant from participating in the statutory appeals before Milton Keynes Magistrates’ Court, investigating further complaints, corresponding with the Claimants, engaging in safeguarding, equality, care planning or alternative dispute resolution discussions, or taking any urgent step required to address an immediate risk to life or serious injury, provided that no enforcement step is taken in reliance upon alleged non- compliance with the notices without further order.

(d) The Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraph 2(a) above on written notice to the Claimants, any such application to be served on each party.

(e) Costs reserved.

THIS IS A PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(b) ABOVE. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. SEE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDE 2024, §17.7.4

REASONS

Anonymity: LGO and LTH are protected parties and LLM acts as their Litigation Friend. Having considered the Article 8 rights of the Claimants and the Article 10 right to freedom of expression, as well as the open justice principle, I am satisfied that (i) non-disclosure of the identity of the Claimants is strictly necessary in order to secure the proper administration of justice and protect the interests of the Claimants; and (ii) there is insufficient countervailing public interest in disclosure of their identities to justify interfering with their Article 8 rights.

Injunctive Relief: This is an application for urgent interim relief which arises out of the service by the defendant local authority of noise abatement notices dated 30 March 2026. Those notices were served on the first, second and fifth claimants. It is common ground that statutory appeals against the notices have been brought and remain pending before the Magistrates’ Court. It is also common ground that the defendant chose to disapply suspension pending appeal, with the consequence that the notices remain in force notwithstanding the ongoing statutory process.

The matter comes before me in my capacity as the Immediate applications judge. I have not determined the question of permission, nor have I given directions for the future conduct of the claim. The present question is whether, in the meantime, the court should grant limited holding relief preserving the position pending further order.

I have considered whether there is a serious issue to be tried, whether damages would be an adequate remedy, and where the balance of convenience, or the least risk of injustice, lies, taking into account the public interest.

I am satisfied, at least to the modest threshold applicable at this stage, that the claim raises serious issues which are properly to be considered in these proceedings. The grounds advanced include challenges founded upon the Public Sector Equality Duty, the Equality Act 2010, and the compatibility of the decision-making process with Article 8 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in circumstances involving profoundly disabled protected parties. For present purposes those are not points which can be dismissed as unarguable on a summary basis but will need to be considered fully as part of the permission application.

I turn then to the question of prejudice. In this respect I accept the central thrust of the claimants’ submission. The abatement notices remain extant and operative. They are expressly not suspended pending the statutory appeals and, by their terms, non- compliance following the compliance date gives rise to potential criminal liability. The fact that an appeal lies, and has been brought, does not alter that position where, as here, suspension has been disapplied and the practical steps which could be taken to comply without impinging upon the health, care arrangements and rights of protected parties is at best unclear. The notices, as framed, require abatement and prohibit recurrence without specifying any particular means of compliance, in a context where it is common ground that the relevant noise is generated by individuals whose vocalisations are involuntary. That gives rise, at the very least, to a position of legal uncertainty and practical pressure which is not readily compensated in damages.

The defendant submits that there is no realistic prospect of enforcement action pending the outcome of the statutory appeal, and that interim relief is therefore unnecessary. However, the difficulty for the defendant is that it has not been prepared to give an unqualified undertaking to that effect. Instead, it has indicated only that it might consider some form of undertaking in the context of further engagement between the parties.

In those circumstances, I do not consider that the claimants can be said to be adequately protected by informal assurances. The notices remain on foot, they carry potential criminal consequences and there is no binding restraint on the defendant’s ability to enforce or rely upon them. In those circumstances, I accept the claimants’ case that they are, as matters stand, exposed to a real and present legal risk notwithstanding the defendant’s stated intention. I accept that this may be said to make the relief urgent.

The prejudice to the defendant of granting limited holding relief appears to me to be slight. The relief sought is narrowly framed: it does not determine the lawfulness of the notices, it does not intrude upon the statutory appeal process, and it does not prevent the defendant from continuing to defend those appeals or to perform its wider statutory functions. If, as the defendant asserts, there is in truth no present intention to enforce the notices pending the appeal, then an order of the court will simply give formal effect to that position and will not materially inhibit the discharge of its duties.

I have taken into account the existence of the statutory appeal and the well-established principle that judicial review is ordinarily a remedy of last resort. However, the present application is directed to a distinct mischief: the continuing legal effect of unsuspended notices pending the determination of that appeal. In my judgment, the statutory process does not provide a complete answer to that problem.

Drawing these matters together, I conclude that the least risk of injustice lies in preserving the position pending further consideration of the claim. The combination of (i) an extant, unsuspended notice carrying potential criminal consequences, (ii) the absence of a binding undertaking from the defendant, and (iii) the limited prejudice to the defendant of holding relief, points clearly in favour of granting interim protection.

For those reasons, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to grant injunctive relief, in limited terms, restraining enforcement action pending further order.

Signed: Mr Justice Sweeting
Dated: 24 June 2026