LOU -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department
Claim number: AC-2025-LON-003625
In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court
22 October 2025
Before:
Mr Justice Johnson
Between:
The King on the application of
LOU
-v-
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Order
On an application by the claimant for an injunction to restrain his removal to France on 22 October 2025
Following consideration of the documents lodged by the claimant
And upon hearing Raggi Kotak of counsel for the claimant and Emma McIveen of counsel for the defendant at a hearing conducted remotely by Teams between 11.25pm and 12 midnight
ORDER by Mr Justice Johnson
- The application is refused.
- Costs reserved.
Reasons
Serious issue to be tried
Ground 1: Attempt to remove the claimant to France prior to determining the application for a determination that there are reasonable grounds to conclude that he is a victim of trafficking.
This ground falls away because the Secretary of State has now made a reasonable grounds decision. It is submitted that the decision is flawed because the Secretary of State did not comply with paragraph 14.13 of the statutory guidance. I disagree. The decision shows that the matter was referred back to the “first responder” and, in any event, the inconsistencies in the claimant’s account were such that the decision maker was reasonably entitled to conclude that further enquiries would not assist. The claimant has not established a serious issue to be tried on this ground.
Ground 2: Unlawfulness of statutory guidance
The defendant has a right to seek referral to the National Referral Mechanism. Any decision as to whether there are reasonable grounds to conclude that he is a victim of trafficking must be lawfully made; relevant factors must be taken into account, irrelevant factors left out of account, and the decision must lie within the bounds of rationality. The claimant does not have any public law right to require a review or reconsideration of an adverse decision. If the decision is flawed on public law grounds then his remedy is by way of a claim for judicial review. There is not, therefore, a serious issue to be tried in respect of ground 2.
Balance of convenience
It has not been shown that the claimant would be at real risk of immediate harm if he is returned to France. He spent some considerable time in France on his way to the United Kingdom, and has not demonstrated that he was subject to inhuman or degrading treatment. There is no evidence that if he were returned to France tomorrow he would be immediately subject to such treatment. He would be able to continue to pursue his claim from France. If it turns out that there is a properly arguably claim for judicial review, and that the claimant is at risk in France, then it would be open to him to seek an order requiring his return to the United Kingdom. Given that there is no evidence of an immediate risk to the claimant on return to France, allowing the removal to take its course, but with the potential for him to return if there is shown to be a longer term risk, would provide a sufficient safeguard for the claimant.
Conversely, there is a strong public interest in the Secretary of State being able to pursue her “1 in 1 out” policy unless or until it is shown to be unlawful or that, in an individual case, a return decision (or a necessary step towards making the return decision) is unlawful. If the court grants interim relief in cases where that has not been shown, then that would be injurious to the public interest. It would reduce the deterrent effect which is fundamental to the intended purpose of the policy so as to reduce large-scale unlawful and dangerous attempts to enter the United Kingdom. This militates strongly in favour of refusing interim relief.
In these circumstances, the balance of convenience strongly militates against the grant of interim relief.
It follows that even if there had been a serious issue to be tried on either ground of claim, I would have refused interim relief.