LYD -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionOrder

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-003628

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

22 October 2025

Before:

Mr Justice Johnson

Between:

The King on the application of
LYD

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

On an application by the claimant for an injunction to restrain his removal to France on 22 October 2025

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the claimant

ORDER by Mr Justice Johnson

  1. For the purpose of this application, and solely to preserve the position, the claimant is granted anonymity and is, until further order, to be referred to in these proceedings as LYD (“the cipher”). The claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not to be disclosed in any proceedings in open court. There is to be substituted for all purposes in these proceedings in place of references to the claimant by name, and whether orally or in writing, references to the cipher.
    Pursuant to s.11 Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings. Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4): (a) The parties must, when filing any statement of case, also file a redacted copy of that statement of case omitting the name, address and any other information which could lead to the identification of the claimant.
    (b) Unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4(C)(6), no non-party may obtain an unredacted copy of any statement of case.
  2. Any person affected by paragraph 1 above may apply to vary or discharge that paragraph by written application served on each party.
  3. The order at paragraph 1 above must, if not set aside before then, be reconsidered when the application for permission to claim judicial review is determined.
  4. The application for an injunction is refused.
  5. The defendant must provide a copy of the rule 35(3) report dated 12 September 2025 to the French authorities so that it is available to those responsible for receiving the claimant in France before he arrives.
  6. The claimant must lodge any draft amended grounds for claiming judicial review by 4pm on 27 October 2025.
  7. The defendant must file an acknowledgement of service and summary grounds by 4pm on 3 November 2025.
  8. The papers are to be put before a judge to consider the application for permission to claim judicial review as soon as is practicable after 4 November 2025.
  9. Costs reserved.

Reasons

Serious issue to be tried

Reasonable grounds decision: There may arguably have been a failure to follow the strict letter of the Secretary of State’s policy which requires the provision of an opportunity to “clarify” any inconsistencies. However, the policy is guidance, not a statute. The defendant is entitled to apply it in a sensible and practical manner. A decision had previously been made that the claimant had been inconsistent. In the light of further information, a further decision was then made (so, to that extent, there had been an opportunity to “clarify”). That further decision identifies numerous and fundamental inconsistencies in the claimant’s account which went well beyond what could have been the subject of resolution by an opportunity to “clarify”. I do not consider that the policy can sensibly be interpreted so as to require, in every case (even where clarification is not reasonably capable of resolving an inconsistency) that an opportunity to clarify is provided. The claimant has not demonstrated that there is a serious issue to be tried in respect of whether the decision was invalid on the grounds of a failure to follow precisely the literal requirements of paragraph 4.13 of the guidance.

Fresh claim decision: The evidence suggests that the claimant will, at least initially, be provided with accommodation such that there is no immediate risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. That, in itself, is highly relevant to (and determinative of) the question of balance of convenience. More broadly, the claimant is being returned to France in the context of a high profile agreement to which the United Kingdom government (to the knowledge of the French government) attaches great importance. The United Kingdom and France are long standing, close and friendly allies with many bilateral agreements. There is a strong relationship of mutual trust and confidence. France is a signatory to the European Convention of Human Rights. There is a strong presumption that the bilateral agreement will be operated in a way that is consistent with that Convention. It would require cogent evidence to conclude that the claimant would be at risk of inhuman or degrading treatment on return to France. The evidence of systemic difficulties in providing accommodation and support to asylum seekers generally does not come close to establishing a risk that the claimant, as an individual, is at such a risk. Nor does the claimant’s medical condition, such as it is, make a difference. France is capable of providing the claimant with adequate medical treatment. The claimant has not established a serious issue to be tried on this issue.

Balance of convenience

I have directed that the rule 35 report be provided to the French authorities. It has not been shown that the French authorities would be unable to provide the claimant with any necessary medical care, including in respect of his mental health and the prevention of suicide, or that he would be at real risk of immediate harm if he is returned to France. He would be able to continue to pursue his claim from France. I have granted expedition, with a view to a permission decision being made within a short period of time. That will enable the court to assess the merits of the claim with the benefit of representations from both sides. If, at that stage, it is shown that the claimant is at real risk of harm then it would be open to the claimant to make a further application for interim relief by way of an order requiring the defendant to permit the claimant to return to the United Kingdom. Given that there is no evidence of an immediate risk to the claimant on return to France, allowing the removal to take its course, but with the potential for him to return if there is shown to be a longer term risk, would provide a sufficient safeguard for the claimant.

Conversely, there is a strong public interest in the Secretary of State being able to pursue her “1 in 1 out” policy unless or until it is shown to be unlawful or that, in an individual case, a return decision (or a necessary step towards making the return decision) is unlawful. If the court grants interim relief in cases where that has not been shown, then that would be injurious to the public interest. It would reduce the deterrent effect which is fundamental to the intended purpose of the policy so as to reduce large-scale unlawful and dangerous attempts to enter the United Kingdom. This militates strongly in favour of refusing interim relief.

In these circumstances, the balance of convenience strongly militates in favour of the grant of expedition, but the refusal of interim relief.
It follows that even if there had been a serious issue to be tried on either ground of claim, I would have refused interim relief.