MA -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2024-LON-002253

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

17 February 2025

Before:

Michael Ford KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

Between:

The King on the application of
MA

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department


Order

Notification of the Judge’s decision on the application for permission to apply for judicial review (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and the Acknowledgement of Service filed by the Defendant and the Claimant’s Reply

ORDER by Michael Ford KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

  1. Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4), the identity of the Claimant shall not be directly or indirectly disclosed and the Claimant shall be anonymised and referred to in these proceedings as “MA”. In any report of these proceedings, there shall be no publication of the name and address of the Claimant, nor of any particulars liable to lead to his identification.
  2. Pursuant to CPR 5.4C and 5.4D, unless the Court grants permission, a non-party may not obtain a copy of a statement of case, order or judgment, or any other document unless it has been redacted so as to refer to the Claimant as “MA”. If an application is made to the Court under CPR rule 5.4C(2) or (6), the Court shall give notice to the Claimant of the application.
  3. The Claimant’s application for an extension of time in which to submit a reply is granted.
  4. The application for permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
  5. The Claimant’s application for interim relief is refused.
  6. The costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service are to be paid by the Claimant to the Defendant, summarily assessed in the sum of £1,815.60.
  7. The Claimant has the benefit of cost protection under section 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The amount of costs that the Claimant shall pay shall be determined on an application by the Defendant under regulation 16 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013. Any objection by the Claimant to the amount of costs claimed shall be dealt with on that occasion

Reasons

  1. The challenge is said to be to the Defendant’s on-going failure to provide the Claimant with adequate accommodation pursuant to s.95 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1999 (“IA 1999”). His claim form was received on 1 July 2024. Through no fault of the Claimant or his lawyers, his application for the matter to be considered by a court within ten days of the date of issue (set out in an N244 dated 1 July 2024) was not referred to a judge until the matter was referred to me on 12 February 2025.
  2. Anonymity. The Claimant is an asylum seeker and in addition the documents contain sensitive information about his mental health and suicide attempts in relation to which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. I consider these are sufficiently weighty reasons to derogate from the important principle of open justice and I have therefore made the orders in paras 1-2 above.
  3. Reply. The Acknowledgement of Service was filed on 16 July 2024 and the Claimant submitted a reply on 2 August 2024, outside the seven-day period in CPR 54.8A(2)(a). He seeks an extension of time to rely on it on the basis that Counsel’s laptop was being repaired, limiting the time for drafting a response, and because the Claimant had changed his phone number and it was only on 29 July that he could be contacted for instructions. The Defendant resists that application
  4. The Reply is four pages long and raises essentially legal arguments. In light of the matters in the reply, the short period for which extension is sought and in the absence of any prejudice to the Defendant, I consider it is just to allow an extension time for considering the Reply. I have accordingly had regard to it in considering whether permission should be granted.
  5. The judicial review challenge. The Claimant is an asylum seeker who arrived in the UK in July 2023. He applied for asylum support under s.95 IAA. In his application form dated 4 January 2024 for accommodation under s.95, he said he had no mental health problems. In a letter dated 11 January 2024 the Defendant accepted that she would provide him with subsistence and accommodation until his asylum claim was decided.
  6. In around April 2024 the Claimant was moved to a hotel in Croydon. On 11 April his GP wrote a letter saying he had been struggling with his sleep and he felt his mental health would improve if he did not have to share a room. He was later moved to Oxford. On 15 May 2024 Asylum Welcome sent an email to the Defendant, asking that he be moved to a shared house in Croydon, explaining that the Claimant had significant mental illness, had been seen in A & E on multiple occasions after suicide attempts and self harm and attaching some medical evidence (see too the later email of 31 May 2024, saying he needed urgent mental health support)
  7. The matter was referred to the Defendant’s medical adviser who, in a report of 21 May 2024, said there was limited evidence that the accommodation had been causative of the Claimant’s medical issues. He advised that the Claimant should be provided with a single room but there was nothing to indicate he required accommodation in Croydon on psychiatric grounds. In a letter of 22 May, the Defendant said that his request for dispersal to Croydon had not been granted because medical services were available throughout the UK but his request for a single room had been granted. According to the Acknowledgement of Service, dated 16 July 2024, he was then the single occupant of a twin room. He was issued with a final warning about his behaviour in his accommodation on 19 June 2024 and has been sent many warnings in the past.
  8. The first ground of challenge is framed as a breach of the Defendant’s policy and irrationality. In the Reply, it is said that the Defendant is in breach of §7.3 of its Policy, Healthcare Needs and Pregnancy Dispersal (the “Policy), by which, wherever possible, the dispersal policy must not adversely affect the mental health of an individual. The suggestion appears to be that the Defendant has repeatedly moved the Claimant, preventing him registering with a GP or accessing stable mental health treatment and he should be located in a major city, where mental health services are better.
  9. However, the Defendant obtained medical advice on the Claimant’s mental health following the correspondence from Asylum Welcome. In reliance on it he was moved to a single room. There is no sufficient basis for an allegation that the Defendant’s Policy required that he be moved to a shared house in a major city owing to his mental health difficulties and nor that he not be moved – especially when the move to a single room was an adjustment made to accommodate the Claimant’s health needs and nothing suggests he would receive worse medical treatment if moved.
  10. Nor do I consider it arguable that the Defendant was required to obtain further information under §4.3 of the Policy and/or acting rationally. The Defendant appears to have assessed the information provided by the Asylum Welcome, to have sought further information from its medical advisers, and to have taken into account the Claimant’s individual circumstances. It might have sought more information but that is a long way from demonstrating it could only act lawfully if it did so.
  11. As for the second ground, the Claimant contends first that the Defendant failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely that the Claimant’s anti-social behaviour, which has led to him being warned on multiple occasions and relocated, was caused by his mental health – and his constant moving prevented his seeking treatment. But there is little evidence beyond assertions to support that contention and, on the evidence before the Defendant, I do not consider it was so obviously material to the decision to move him to a single room that it is arguably was irrational to ignore it (or that it would have made any difference to the decision to move him to a single room, when that decision was taken in the interests of his mental health).
  12. The second allegation is that the Defendant failed to take into account the Claimant’s need for stable, ongoing mental health support. The letter of 22 May 2024 suggests the Claimant’s individual circumstances were considered, so this argument faces an uphill struggle. In any case, in circumstances where the move to a single room was a reasonable adjustment for his mental health made at the request of the Claimant’s advisors, where the Defendant was entitled to consider that mental services were available throughout the UK, and where other moves were (it seems) made because of the Claimant’s anti-social behaviour, I do not consider this factor was so obviously material that the Defendant was required, acting rationally, to have regard to it: the key and pressing need was to move the Claimant to a single room, in accordance with the medical advice.
  13. Interim relief. The application for interim relief falls away with my decision on permission. For the reasons I have given in any event I do not consider that the Claimant has shown the sufficiently strong prima facie case required for a mandatory injunction requiring him to be accommodated in a major UK city R (RRR Manufacturing) v Medicines and Healthcare Products [2024] EWCA Civ 530) – especially given that he is already located in accommodation which takes account of his mental health needs and there is no evidence to show he would receive better treatment in major UK city.
  14. Costs. There is an application for costs in section 4 of the Acknowledgement of Service for £1,815.60 based on 10.2 hours work at £178 an hour. I consider those costs are reasonable and proportionate. As the Claimant has Legal Aid, I have made the appropriate orders.