September 12, 2025

MA -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative Court High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-LON-002706

In the High Court of Justice
Kings Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

11 September 2025

Before:

HHJ de Bertodano
sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

Between:

The King
on the application of
MA

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

Notification of the Judge’s decision on the application for permission to apply for judicial review (CPR 54.11, 54.12); and other applications including an application for interim relief.

Following consideration of the Statement of Facts and Grounds, Summary Grounds of Defence and the Claimant’s Reply

ORDER by HHJ de Bertodano sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

Anonymity

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
(i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
(ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as MA.
(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
(c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
(i) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;
(ii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non- party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.
Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
No order is therefore made in respect of the applications for interim relief.
No order is made for costs.

Background

The Claimant is a 12-year-old child of Nigerian parents. She was born in the UK on 1 May 2013. She moved to Nigeria in May 2019 and has lived there ever since.
On 5 May 2024 her mother submitted her MN1 application for British citizenship. The application included evidence of the Claimant’s UK birth, academic progress, and hopes of continuing her education in the UK.
She received notification of the refusal of her application on 25 July 2025. The decision was dated 18 February 2025. It was sent to the Claimant’s Nigerian address but it was not in fact delivered. The Defendant received notification of the failure on 30 June 2025.
The decision letter was reissued on 25 July 2025 by email.
The Claimant lodged a Pre-Action Protocol challenging the refusal on 27 July 2025; On 5 August 2025 an application for judicial review was served on the Home Office. On 14 August 2025 the application was lodged with the court.
On 15 August 2025 Mould J made an order timetabling service of documents by both parties, pending a referral to a judge for a decision on whether to grant permission to apply for judicial review within 7 days on 3 September 2025.
The time having elapsed and all papers having been served as per the order, this court is in a position to make a decision on the issue of permission to apply for judicial review.

Preliminary issue
The Defendant argues that the Claimant has not exhausted all alternative remedies before applying for judicial review. The Claimant should have requested a review of the decision via the Form NR. However, in the circumstances, in particular the urgency of the application given the Claimant’s plans for schooling; the fact that the review would have been undertaken by the same body which had not only refused the original application, but has also provided supplementary grounds for refusal in its letter of 6 August 2025; and the fact that the original application had not received a decision for a period of 14 months; the Claimant was entitled in this case to consider that all alternative remedies were effectively exhausted, and to apply for judicial review at this stage. While in most cases, in particular where the Defendant has adhered to the timetable, it is desirable that a review should be requested and undertaken before an application for judicial review is made, there is no strict requirement that this must be done before judicial review can be considered. In this case, there is no real prospect that this would in any meaningful way have provided an alternative remedy for the Claimant.

Grounds for Judicial Review
The documents filed by the Claimant are lengthy and the court has considered all the arguments made. It deals in here with the principal matters.
The principal ground for judicial review is that the Defendant misapplied S3(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981. The Claimant argues that the Defendant applied the Statutory Tests under S 1(3) and 1(4) of the same act, which allows a child born in the United Kingdom to acquire British citizenship in circumstances where a parent becomes a British national after their birth, or becomes settled in the United Kingdom; or where a child continues to live in the United Kingdom after birth for 10 years. These, argues the Claimant, are irrelevant. The Claimant’s application was made under S3(1) which reads as follows:

If while a person is a minor an application is made for his registration as a British citizen, the Secretary of State may, if he thinks fit, cause him to be registered as such a citizen.
The Claimant cites Home Office Guidance “Registration as a British citizen: children”. She claims that the Defendant has failed to properly exercise her discretion and has failed to follow this guidance.
The court has considered these arguments. The Defendant was not only entitled to but was required to consider whether the Claimant met the statutory tests under S1(3) and 1(4), before going on to consider the application under S3(1). The fact that the Claimant agrees that these tests are not met does not make their consideration irrelevant.
In her decision dated 18 February 2025, and reissued on 25 July 2025, the Defendant deals with the application under S3(1) in the following way.

We have also considered your application under section 3(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981.
Registration under this provision is at the Secretary of State’s discretion. Normally, a minor will not be registered if, as appears in this case, neither of their parents is a British citizen and both of their parents are not ‘settled’ in the UK as defined by the immigration laws.
A minor will not be registered if, as appears in this case, she is resident abroad and their future does not clearly lie in the UK.
A minor will not be registered if, as appears in this case, she is not ‘settled’ in the UK as defined by the immigration laws.
These expectations are not met. We have therefore considered registration exceptionally but do not consider there are sufficient grounds to register, and your child’s application is refused.
While this is brief, it is clear that S3(1) was considered. Although the guidance is not specifically referenced, it is clearly referred to by the decision maker in the paragraphs quoted above. The Claimant does not fit into any of the categories headed “Scenarios where we would normally expect to register a child under section 3(1)”. The appropriate guidance is therefore given under the section entitled “Registering exceptionally under Section 3(1) It reads as follows:

The expectation is that registration should normally only take place where a child satisfies the criteria set out elsewhere in this guidance. However, under section 3(1) of the BNA 1981 the Home Secretary has discretion to register a person under the age of 18 at the date of application where they see fit to do so.
In considering whether it is appropriate to register a child on this basis, you must take all the following factors into account:
· the child’s future intentions
· the child’s parents’ circumstances
· residence in the UK
· the child’s immigration status
· any compelling compassionate circumstances raised as part of the application
It is clear that these matters were properly considered by the decision maker, and that the discretion was exercised lawfully.
Further grounds are raised as follows:
The Claimant asserts that the Defendant breached S55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 in failing to consider the best interests of the child. It is clear from the decision in Mundeba [2013] UKUT 00088 (IAC) that this requirement does not apply when the child resides outside the United Kingdom. It is nevertheless addressed by the Defendant in the supplementary letter of 6 August 2025 and determined in favour of the Claimant remaining with her family in Nigeria. The fact that the reasoning was explained in a supplementary letter after the situation arose does not mean that it was not part of the original decision making process.
The Claimant asserts that the refusal to grant her citizenship is a breach of her Article 8 ECHR right to a private and family life. Given that the Claimant and her family live in Nigeria, and have done so for the last 6 years, it is impossible to see how the refusal of British citizenship can interfere with that right.
The Claimant argues that the lengthy delay makes the decision-making process unlawful. There was a lengthy gap of 10 months between the application and the decision, the remaining delay is accepted to have been caused by postal issues in Nigeria, which were remedied shortly after the Defendant became aware of them. While it is understandable that this caused frustration to the Claimant, there is nothing in this delay which amounts to a procedural unfairness.
In conclusion, the Claimant says that all these matters render the decision made by the Defendant irrational according to the Wednesbury definition.
The court has considered and rejected all these arguments. The simple facts are these: the Claimant, who is now 12 years old, was born in the UK, and moved back to Nigeria around her 6th birthday. At the time of her application she had spent almost half her young life in Nigeria. Her parents are both living in Nigeria. Neither are British citizens. The fact that there are members of her wider family who are settled in the United Kingdom in itself provides no grounds for the Claimant to have an expectation of continuing her education and her life there. It is very sad that she has suffered bereavement of her grandparents and uncle, but this has no relevance to her argument that she should be granted British citizenship. The fact that she has made applications to continue her schooling in Britain without having successfully applied for citizenship cannot support her argument that she should be granted citizenship on that basis. The fact that she is doing exceptionally well at school in Nigeria provides no support for her argument that her education should be continued in the United Kingdom.
The Defendant applied the law correctly and there are no grounds to substantiate the argument that the decision was unreasonable or irrational. The Claimant’s argument therefore fails.

Conclusion

Permission to pursue an application for judicial review is refused.
Given the refusal of permission for judicial review of the substantive matter, the subsidiary and interim applications no longer fall to be decided.

Costs

The court takes into account the very substantial delay in the defendant’s notification of its initial decision in making no order for costs.

HHJ Sylvia de Bertodano
11 September 2025