MIN -v- Birmingham Children’s Trust (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case number: AC-2026-BHM-000285

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

27 July 2026

Before:

HHJ Tindal,
sitting as a Judge of the High Court

Between:

The King
on the application of
MIN
(Claimant)

-v-

Birmingham Children’s Trust
(Defendant)

and

MBK
(Interested Party)

Order

Notification of the Judge’s decision on the application for permission

After consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant only

ORDER by HHJ Tindal (Sitting as a Judge of the High Court)

  1. Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4)) and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction:
    a. No person shall identify the Claimant in connection with these proceedings. The Claimant shall be referred to as MIN and the Interested Party as MBK.
    b. A non-party may not obtain or inspect a copy of any Statement of Case or any other document filed with the Court and to which a non-party may have access pursuant to CPR 5.4A-D or otherwise, unless it has been produced or edited so as to comply with para.1 of this Order and/or any subsequent direction made by the Court.
    c. Anyone affected by the terms of this Order shall have permission to apply to vary or set aside any part of it, on 3 working days’ notice.
  2. The Claimant’s application for permission for judicial review is refused.
  3. Should the Claimant seek oral renewal of permission within 7 days under CPR 54.12, he must give an explanation why his claim is out of time.
  4. Time for the Defendant to file and serve an Acknowledgement of Service is extended until 14 days after service of any application by the Claimant for oral renewal of permission.
  5. The Claimant may file and serve a Reply 7 days after service of the Acknowledgement of Service, after which the case will be listed for permission oral renewal hearing.
  6. No order for costs.

Reasons

  1. The Claimant is a litigant in person who seeks to challenge the decision of HHJ Hickman in the Family Court on the 23 September 2025 not to ‘defer, amend, stay or dismiss the Placement Order’ for his grandson. While the Claimant has not sought anonymity, in his grandson’s and the Interested Party’s interests (as another family member) I shall grant it.
  2. The Claimant says he was encouraged to claim Judicial Review by HHJ Hickman’s criticisms of the placement process by the Defendant, which she certainly made in her Order of 23rd September 2025, in the course of dismissing his application to revoke the Placement Order because his son had already been placed for adoption – a statutory bar to revocation.
  3. It is unclear from HHJ Hickman’s Order whether she went so far as to suggest the Claimant should pursue judicial review proceedings, but on the assumption she did, she might have expected the Claimant to pursue those proceedings ‘promptly and in any event within 3 months’ as required by Civil Procedure Rules 54.5; and to challenge the placement itself on 18th August 2025, rather than her own decision on 23rd September 2025.
  4. However, the Claimant did not claim Judicial Review of the placement itself and certainly not within three months of it (mid-November 2025). Whilst he filed the present claim on 21st December 2025, it was not issued until July 2026, because he had not obtained permission of the Family Court to rely on its orders and documents (again suggesting HHJ Hickman was not as encouraging of Judicial Review as the Claimant may have thought). Whilst the claim is within three months of HHJ Hickman’s decision, it is more than three months from the date of placement itself.
  5. In relation to the placement, there is no explanation why the Claimant did not issue his claim by mid-November 2025 and no apparent explanation for that delay. That is itself a reason to refuse permission for any challenge to the placement process. Another is that under s.31(6) Senior Courts Act 1981, the Administrative Court can refuse permission for Judicial Review if there has been ‘undue delay’ (which can be less than three months) which would cause ‘substantial hardship’. A challenge to the placement process of a child is one of the most urgent types of judicial review claim because delay is individous to a child’s welfare (s.1(2) Children Act 1989). Whilst it may have been one thing for HHJ Hickman to envisage Judicial Review proceedings within a month of placement, by the time the Claimant filed this claim, his son had already been placed for four months – clearly ‘undue delay’. Moreover, by the time the Claimant finally communicated with the Administrative Court about Family Court document permission, another six months had gone by. There would be obvious substantial hardship to the adopters and the Claimant’s son now in quashing the placement. So even if there is legitimate criticism of the Defendant in relation to the placement process, I am afraid it is far too late.
  6. In relation to HHJ Hickman’s decision, it is simply not open to the Claimant to challenge it. In A Father v Worcestershire CC [2025] 2 WLR 155 (SC) it was explained that the Family Court – not the Administrative Court – is the proper forum for decisions about childrens’ welfare; and if there is a concern about the Family Court’s decision, it should be appealed not subjected to Judicial Review. The Claimant has appealed HHJ Hickman’s order and the Court of Appeal refused permission and certified it totally without merit, so HHJ Hickman’s decision cannot be re-opened now.
  7. Therefore, I refuse permission to claim Judicial Review and indeed I did consider whether to certify the claim totally without merit. However, given I have not considered the merits of the Claimant’s challenge to the placement process, which was clearly criticised by HHJ Hickman, I refrain from so certifying it.
  8. I normally await the Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Service then the Claimant’s Reply before considering permission. But as the claim is so late and so close to totally without merit, I invite the Claimant to reflect on whether he really wishes to pursue this claim, which may be pointless and if the Defendant has to respond, may well lead to a significant costs order against him. However, he has the right to seek reconsideration if he chooses – and I have made consequential directions if he does.

Signed: HHJ Tindal