MKM -v- London Borough of Ealing (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-002626

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

21 August 2025

Before:

John Halford

Between:

The King on the application of
MKM

-v-

London Borough of Ealing

Order

Notification of Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration:

  1. of the documents filed by the Claimant;
  2. the Article 8 ECHR rights of the Claimant and her children to respect for private and family life, and the Article 10 right to freedom of expression; and
  3. of the anonymity application and it appearing that non-disclosure of the identity of the Claimant and her children is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in order to protect their interests and that there is no sufficient countervailing public interest in disclosure of their identities;

ORDER BY JOHN HALFORD SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE

  1. Permission to apply for judicial review
    Permission is granted on all grounds.
  2. Mandatory injunction:
    (a) The Defendant shall continue to provide the Claimant and her children with accommodation pending determination of this claim.
    (b) As this order has been made without a hearing, the Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraph 2(a) above, any such application to be served on each party.
    NOTE: THIS IS A MANDATORY INJUNCTION. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(b) ABOVE.
  3. Expedition: The hearing of the claim is expedited for the reasons given below. The hearing is to be listed no later than 22 December 2025.
  4. Anonymity
    (a) The identity of the Claimant is a party to these proceedings is confidential and shall not be published nor shall the identities of her children.
    (b) For the purposes of this order ‘publication’ includes any speech, writing, broadcast, or other communication in whatever form (including Internet and social media), which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public.
    (c) ‘Publication’ for the purposes of this order includes any further publication (as defined in paragraph 3(b) above) from the date of this order, even if such information is derived from a previous stage or stages of these proceedings.
    (d) Pursuant to CPR Rule 39.2(4), there shall not be disclosed in any report of these proceedings or any other publication the name or address of the Claimant or her children, or any details (including other names, addresses, or a specific combination of facts) that could lead to the identification of the Claimant as a party to these proceedings. The Claimant and her children shall be referred to as set out in paragraph 2(c) of this order.
    (e) The Claimant shall be referred to as MKM and her children shall be referred to as AKM and BKM.
    (f) Many of the details which, on their own or together with other information publicly available may lead to the identification of the Claimant or her children shall be redacted before publication.
    (g) Pursuant to CPR rules 5.4C and 5.4D:
    (i) A person is not a party to the proceedings may not obtain a copy of a statement of case, judgement or order from the court records unless the statement of case, judgement or order has been anonymized in accordance with subparagraph 2(d) and (e) above.
    (ii) If a person who is not a party to the proceedings applies (pursuant to CPR rule 5.4 C (1B) or (2)) for permission to inspect or obtain a copy of any other document or communication, such application shall be on at least seven days notice to each party’s solicitors, trustee or deputy.
    (h) The Claimant’s solicitors shall file with the court and electronic (PDF bundle) of the statement of case that has been anonymized in accordance with paragraph 2(d) above within 14 days of the date of this order and refiled in the event that any statement of case is amended within 21 days of any such amendment being approved.
    (i) The court file shall be clearly marked with the words “an anonymity order was made on this case on 21 August 2025 and any application by a non-party to inspect to obtain a copy document from this file must be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the order.”
    (j) Pursuant to the ‘Practice Guidance: Publication of Privacy and Anonymity Orders’ issued by the Master of the Rolls dated 16 April 2019, a copy of this order shall be published on the judicial website of the High Court of Justice. For that purpose, a court officer will send a copy of the order by email to the judicial office at judicialwebupdates@judiciary.uk
    (k) Any interested party, whether or not a party to the proceedings may apply to the court to vary or discharge this anonymity order provided that any such application is made on seven days’ notice to each party’s solicitors, trustee or deputy.
  5. Case Management Directions:
    (a) The Defendant shall file a Notice of Acknowledgement of Service within 14 days of the date of this order. The requirement for filing Summary Grounds of Resistance with the Notice of Acknowledgement of Service is dispensed with.
    (b) The Defendant must, within 35 days of the date of service of this Order, file and serve (i) Detailed Grounds for contesting the claim or supporting it on additional grounds and (ii) any written evidence to be relied on.
    (c) Any application by the Claimant to serve evidence in reply must be filed and served, together with a copy of that evidence, within 21 days of the date on which the Defendant serves evidence pursuant to 5(b) above.
    (d) The parties must agree the contents of the hearing bundle. An electronic version of the bundle must be prepared and lodged, in accordance with the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide Chapter 21 and the Guidance on the Administrative Court website, not less than 28 days before the date of the substantive hearing. The parties must, if requested by the Court, lodge 2 hard-copy versions of the hearing bundle.
    (e) The Claimant must file and serve a Skeleton Argument (maximum 25 pages), complying with CPR 54 PD para. 15 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide paras 20.1 to 20.3, not less than 21 days before the date of the substantive hearing.
    (f) The Defendant must file and serve a Skeleton Argument (maximum 25 pages), complying with CPR 54 PD para. 15 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide paras 20.1 to 20.3, not less than 14 days before the date of the substantive hearing.
    (g) The parties must agree the contents of a bundle containing the authorities to be referred to at the hearing. An electronic version of the bundle must be prepared in accordance with the Guidance on the Administrative Court website. The parties must, if requested by the Court, prepare a hard-copy version of the authorities bundle. The electronic version of the bundle and if requested, the hard copy version of the bundle, must be lodged with the Court not less than 7 days before the date of the substantive hearing.
    (h) The time estimate for the substantive hearing is 1.5 days. If either party considers that this time estimate should be varied, they must inform the court as soon as possible.

Observations and reasons

(1) It is strongly arguable that the challenged assessment and offer decisions are unlawful. On their face, the offers appear to be based on an inadequate assessment of the Claimant’s needs and those of her children which takes no meaningful account of their local support network, the consequences of it coming to an end as a result of a move to Durham, what if any appropriate support services are available there and the extent to which they would be substitute for any of the support the Claimant and her children have locally nor, most importantly, what the consequences of a move could be for each of them. It is therefore hard to see how the plan can be reconciled with the Defendant’s section 189A and 208 Housing Act 1996, section 11 Children Act 2004 and Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2012 duties. Compounding these difficulties, the offer letters contain a mantra-like recitation of generic suitability factors that are said to have been considered. As such, they provide no real assurance that the Claimant’s own and her children’s particular circumstances have been adequately taken into account by the Defendant. The extent to which they have been will, of course, become apparent once the Defendant’s evidence is filed. As for the alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the County Court in respect of Grounds 3 and 4, I am satisfied this need not be exhausted in the present case given the points made at paragraphs 101-106 of the Grounds. Most significantly, only the Administrative Court can deal with grounds 1 and it would make little sense in resource management terms for two Courts to be dealing with the related Grounds in parallel.
(2) As far as interim relief application is concerned, I have proceeded on the basis that the Defendant has not responded to the pre-action protocol letter sent by the Claimant’s solicitor despite (a) the Pre-Action Protocol and (b) its express indication that it would do so by 14 August 2025 (because, had there been a response, the Claimant would have needed to bring it to the Court’s attention). I also note that nothing has been filed by the Defendant in response to the claim or the applications. My decisions on interim relief, expedition and abridgement are therefore necessarily based wholly on the documents filed by the Claimant. I consider it appropriate to determine those applications now in the particular circumstances of this case, though I have made provision in the order for the Defendant to apply make a set-aside application if, for example, circumstances have materially changed since the claim was filed or have not been accurately summarised by the Claimant.
(3) Turning to the detail of that application, the accommodation currently being provided under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 appears to be precarious. The Defendant’s email of 6 August 2025 does not provide sufficient assurance that it will not be withdrawn until either these proceedings are concluded or become unnecessary because the local authority has made a new decision on discharging its housing duties. The absence of an indication from the Social Services Department that the accommodation will be terminated and the fact of the children remaining ‘in need’ for the purposes of the 1989 Act and having a need for accommodation do not, in themselves amount to a positive assurance there will be accommodation provided for the foreseeable future nor it will be provided for the whole household together the position might be different had there been a fully documented assessment of the children’s needs and a plan to meet them, but there does not appear to be one at present). In such circumstances, an interim mandatory order requiring the Defendant to continue providing the Claimant and her children with accommodation whilst the proceedings are ongoing is appropriate. I have carefully weighed the considerations for and against such an order noting this judicial review claim raises a strong prima facie case. The balance of convenience, having regard to the public interest as well as the circumstances of the Claimant and her children, warrants making an order. There is no dispute about her being an unwell, highly vulnerable single parent. The consequences of section 17 accommodation being withdrawn, or perhaps only provided to the children, would potentially be very serious. The knowledge there is an ongoing risk of that happening may well be damaging to the Claimant’s mental health. There is no significant countervailing prejudice to the Defendant in continuing to accommodate the Claimant and her children, especially in circumstances where it is currently doing so.
(4) Abridgement and expedition are appropriate in addition to an interim mandatory order because the evidence I have considered indicates uncertainty over what may happen in the medium to long term, notwithstanding provision of accommodation under the mandatory order, is likely to have a detrimental impact on the Claimant and her children. However, the interim mandatory order makes the extremely truncated timetable sought by the Claimant unnecessary.
(5) Anonymity for the Claimant and her children is wholly appropriate given her background and vulnerability and the fact they are minors.