MM -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (order)

Administrative CourtCivilHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case number: AC-2024-LON-003900

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

14 March 2025

Before:

Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC,
Deputy High Court Judge

Between:

The King
on the application of
MM

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

Notification of the Judge’s decision on the application for permission to apply for judicial review (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

UPON consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and the Acknowledgement of Service filed by the Defendant;

AND UPON the Claimant’s application for interim relief and anonymity by application dated 20 November 2024;

ORDER by Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, Deputy Judge of the High Court:

  1. Permission: permission to apply for judicial review is granted on all grounds.
  2. Interim Relief:

THIS IS A MANDATORY INJUNCTION. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(c) BELOW

(a) Pending determination of this application for judicial review or further order, the Defendant shall, by no later than 4pm 31 March 2025, relocate the Claimant and her family to adequate, non-hotel, dispersal accommodation, within a reasonable traveling distance of the Claimant’s son’s school, and as required under s.95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.

(b) The Defendant shall give the Claimant’s solicitors no less than 24 hours’ notice in writing of the address of the accommodation to be provided pursuant to paragraph 2(a) above, as well as the time and date of the transfer of the Claimant to that accommodation.

(c) The Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) above, any such application to be served on each party.

  1. Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimant’s name, and that of her children, is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as MM and her children as MS (son) and MD (daughter).

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or her children or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or her children in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):

(i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or her children;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or her children, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

  1. Case Management Directions:

(a) The Defendant must, within 35 days of the date of service of this Order, file and serve (i) Detailed Grounds for contesting the claim or supporting it on additional grounds and (ii) any written evidence to be relied on.

(b) The Defendant may comply with sub-paragraph (a)(i) above by filing and serving a document which states that its Summary Grounds are to stand as the Detailed Grounds required by CPR 54.14.

(c) Any application by the Claimant to serve evidence in reply must be filed and served, together with a copy of that evidence, within 21 days of the date on which the Defendant serves evidence pursuant to (a) above.

(d) The parties must agree the contents of the hearing bundle. An electronic version of the bundle must be prepared and lodged, in accordance with the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide Chapter 21 and the Guidance on the Administrative Court website, not less than 28 days before the date of the substantive hearing. The parties must, if requested by the Court, lodge 2 hard- copy versions of the hearing bundle.

(e) The Claimant must file and serve a Skeleton Argument (maximum 25 pages), complying with CPR 54 PD para. 15 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide paras 20.1 to 20.3, not less than 21 days before the date of the substantive hearing.

(f) The Defendant must file and serve a Skeleton Argument (maximum 25 pages), complying with CPR 54 PD para. 15 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide paras 20.1 to 20.3, not less than 14 days before the date of the substantive hearing.

(g) The parties must agree the contents of a bundle containing the authorities to be referred to at the hearing. An electronic version of the bundle must be prepared in accordance with the Guidance on the Administrative Court website. The parties must, if requested by the Court, prepare a hard-copy version of the authorities bundle. The electronic version of the bundle and if requested, the hard copy version of the bundle, must be lodged with the Court not less than 7 days before the date of the substantive hearing.

(h) The time estimate for the substantive hearing is 1 day. If either party considers that this time estimate should be varied, they must inform the court as soon as possible.

  1. Other Directions: The consent order dated 17 December 2024 and filed with the Court is to be sealed.

6. Costs: Costs reserved.

Observations and Reasons

Background

  1. The Claimant (an Egyptian national) applies for judicial review challenging the Defendant’s failure to provide adequate dispersal accommodation for the Claimant and her two children (now aged 16 and 7) pursuant to duties under s95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. She arrived in the UK with her children on 12 July 2022 and claimed asylum (an appeal against refusal is pending). She has been in hotel accommodation since.
  2. There are 3 grounds:

a. First, the Defendant has unlawfully breached s95 of the 1999 Act. It is said the Defendant has accepted the Claimant’s application for accommodation (extending to her children) but has provided inadequate accommodation and has failed to undertake a detailed analysis of this family’s situation and specific vulnerabilities. Further it is said that the Defendant accepts the family requires dispersal accommodation within a reasonable distance of the Claimant’s son’s school (he is doing GCSEs this year) and has failed to provide it (only offering unsuitable accommodation in Bristol at the start of 2024). The Claimant maintains the Defendant cannot show she has acted within reasonable diligence to secure adequate accommodation.

b. Second, the defendant has breached Article 8 ECHR. It is argued that the Defendant’s delay and the failure to provide adequate accommodation is a breach of Article 8 ECHR.

c. Third, it is said that the Defendant has failed to have regard, or adequate regard to the welfare of the Claimant’s children, and has breached her duty under s55 of the Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of the Claimant’s children.

  1. In the PAP response (21 October 2024) the Defendant maintained the accommodation provided was adequate. The letter accepted that the Claimant had been granted dispersal accommodation on 17 January 2024 and that the request to be dispersed to accommodation within 1 hour of the Claimant’s son’s school had been granted. It stated “Your client will be contacted in due course once an appropriate accommodation has been sourced”.

4. An email to the Court dated 4 December 2024 from the SSHD’s solicitors explained that only 2 properties met the Claimant’s requirements in terms of size and travel distance from the school. Only one was viable in terms of availability. The issue is that it was having works done to it with a completion date of “mid December/early January”. In light of that the parties agreed a stay until 15 January 2025. A consent order was filed but has not yet been sealed. I will direct that this takes place.

5. After the stay expired, the SSHD filed an Acknowledgment of Service. That explained updates on the work at the property had been obtained but work was still being undertaken. On 13 January 2025, the SSHD ascertained “it is now likely not to be available until end of January to possibly mid-February”. The Defendant’s position is that she has taken and continues to take all reasonable steps to secure suitable accommodation but has limited housing stock and the current delay on the property identified is not within her control. In all the circumstances she submits the delay is not unlawful.

6. The Claimant replied to the AoS on 22 January 2025 inviting the Court to proceed to determine permission and interim relief. The final document on the file is a letter to the Court on behalf of the Defendant dated 7 February 2025 which states a further potential property has been found but “they both seem to be going very slowly and would not expect either to be ready before the end of March”.

Permission

  1. I have been referred to the helpful judgment of Tom Little KC, DHCJ in R (AYW and others) v SSHD [2024] EWHC 3291, which applies the judgment of the Supreme Court in R (Imam) v Croydon LBC [2023] 3 WLR 1178 to the duties at play in this case.

8. Having considered the issues set out in the papers, the period of time in question, and the explanations given, I am satisfied that the grounds advanced are arguable and that permission should be granted.

Interim Relief

  1. The Claimant applied for interim relief some time ago (20 November 2024). This was then overtaken by the stay in proceedings. The Claimant renewed her application for interim relief in her reply to the Acknowledgment of Service on 22 January 2025.

10. I am satisfied that there is a serious issue to be tried in this case, and that the Claimant has a sufficiently strong case in circumstances where interim relief would give her the principal remedy she seeks in the underlying claim.

11. I turn to the balance of convenience. The Claimant and her children will suffer significant prejudice if interim relief is not granted and it later is established that mandatory relief should be granted. I place particular weight on the impact on her son who is undertaking GCSEs this year as well as the evidence of impact on the Claimant and her daughter. I weigh that against that the consequences if it turns out mandatory relief should not have been granted: in those circumstances, the Claimant will have be prioritised over others to whom the SSHD owes a duty.

12. In this case I am satisfied the balance falls in favour of interim relief.

13. The Court has had no update since early February. The last indication was that accommodation was anticipated to be available by the end of March. I bear in mind the length of time that has passed in this case. Having considered the points made in the Claimant’s grounds in support of Interim Relief document (esp from §§8ff by reference to R (Humnyntskyi) v SSHD [2021] 1 WLR 320 at §179) I consider an order requiring suitable dispersal accommodation by the end of March (just over 14 days) strikes the appropriate balance between the interests concerned and allows the SSHD sufficient time to look at options beyond the two properties currently in view if necessary. I consider a period longer than 7 days appropriate given the particular geographical restrictions on properties that will be suitable in this case.

14. Given I have granted interim relief, I have not otherwise expedited the hearing of this case.

15. There will be liberty to apply in relation to the order for interim relief.

Anonymity

  1. This case involves two children and necessitates the ventilation of a certain amount of private and medical information concerning the family and their needs. The Claimant is also an asylum seeker and there are implications for her should she be returned. Bearing in mind the strong public interest in open justice, I consider a modest restriction on that principle to be justified to protect the identities of the Claimant and her children in order to safeguard their safety and privacy and Article 8 ECHR rights. I therefore make an anonymity order.

Signed: Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, Deputy High Court Judge
Dated: 14 March 2025