December 9, 2025

NA -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department and others (anonymity order)

Administrative Court High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-LON-000522

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

24 November 2025

Before:

Robert Palmer KC
(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)

Between:

The King
on the application of
NA
(Claimant)

-v-

(1) Secretary of State for the Home Department
(2) Director of Public Prosecutions
(3) Chief Constable of Kent Police
(Defendants)

Order

Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant, the Defendants’ Summary Grounds of Defence, and the Claimant’s Consolidated Reply

ORDER BY ROBERT PALMER KC
(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)

Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as NA.

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non- party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

Applications: In response to the application notices filed by the parties:

(a) time for the First Defendant to file the Acknowledgement of Service is extended to 7 April 2025;
(b) the Claimant is permitted to file the Reply to the Defendants’ Summary Grounds of Defence, notwithstanding that it is longer than 5 pages.

Permission: Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.

4. Costs: The Claimant must pay the First Defendant’s costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence, summarily assessed in the sum of £2,368.75. No order for costs is made in respect of the Second and Third Defendants’ costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence.

5. Further provision as to costs:

(a) The Claimant has the benefit of cost protection for the purposes of s. 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. Accordingly:

(i) paragraph 4 specifies the maximum amount that the Claimant may be held liable to pay;

(ii) the amount of costs that the Claimant is liable to pay is to be determined on an application by the other party under regulation 16 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.

(b) If the Claimant wishes to object to the order in paragraph 4 in principle, or the maximum amount there specified, the following directions apply.

(c) Where the Claimant does not make a valid request for reconsideration of the decision to refuse permission to apply for judicial review (see notes below):

(i) Within 14 days of the date of this Order, the Claimant may file and serve a notice of objection (maximum 3 pages) showing why the order in paragraph 4 should not be made. The notice should include any objections to the principle that costs should be paid and/or as to the amount specified.

(ii) If the Claimant does not file and serve a notice of objection within that period, paragraph 4 is a final order, which specifies the maximum amount that the Claimant may be held liable to pay.

(iii) If the Claimant files and serves a notice of objection in accordance with (i) above:

the other party may, within 14 days after the date on which the notice is served, file and serve submissions in response (maximum 3 pages);
if the other party files and serves on the Claimant submissions
in response, the Claimant may, within 7 days after the date on which the other party’s submissions in response are served, file and serve reply submissions (maximum 3 pages);
the Court will determine what costs order to make on the
papers;
any costs ordered must be paid within 14 days of the date of
the Court’s order (in accordance with CPR 44.7(1)(a)), unless the Court specifies another date.

(d) Where the Claimant makes a valid request for reconsideration (see notes below):

(i) Paragraph 4 does not become final as respects the maximum amount of the claimant’s liability to a party unless, insofar as it relates to that party:

the Claimant withdraws the application for permission; or
permission to apply for judicial review is refused on all grounds
after a hearing.

(ii) If the Claimant wishes to contend that the order in paragraph 4 should not be made even if permission is refused on all grounds, the Claimant must within 14 days after the date of this Order file and serve a notice of objection (maximum 3 pages). The notice should include any objections to the principle that costs should be paid and/or as to the amount specified.

(iii) If the Claimant files and serves a notice of objection in accordance with (ii) above:

the other party may, within 14 days after the date on which the notice is served, file and serve submissions in response (maximum 3 pages);
if the other party files and serves on the Claimant submissions
in response, the Claimant may, within 7 days after the date on which those submissions are served, file and serve reply submissions (maximum 3 pages);
the Court will determine what costs order to make at or after the permission hearing.

6. Renewal directions: Where the Claimant makes a valid request for reconsideration (see notes below), the following directions apply:

(a) The permission hearing is to be listed at the same time and date as the hearing of any valid request for reconsideration made in respect of Claim No AC-2025-LON-001362, R (KD) v SSHD and others, and no later than the week commencing 26 January 2026.

(b) The permission hearing is to be listed before a High Court Judge with a time estimate of 2 hours in respect of this claim alone, including submissions by the parties and an oral judgment by the judge, or with a time estimate of 3 hours if to be heard with a renewed application in KD. If the Claimant considers that more time should be allowed, the time estimate must be included with the request for reconsideration of permission.

(c) Within 21 days of the service of this Order, the Claimant must file and serve an electronic copy of the Permission Hearing Bundle, prepared in accordance with the guidance on the Administrative Court website and containing the following documents:

(i) the Claim Form, Statement of Facts and Grounds and any evidence or other documents filed with the Claim Form;

(ii) any Acknowledgment of Service, Summary Grounds of Defence and any accompanying documents served by any Defendant and/or Interested Party;

(iii) any Reply or other document served by any party to the proceedings at the paper permission stage;

(iv) this Order;

(v) the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review (on Form 86B);

(vi) any other document the Court would be likely to consider material to its decision on permission to apply for judicial review.

(d) If the Claimant fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), permission will be determined on the basis of the renewal notice and the documents before the Court at the paper stage, unless at the hearing the Court otherwise directs.

(e) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, the Claimant must file and serve:

(i) a skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages;

(ii) an electronic bundle containing any authorities which the Court needs to read at the hearing (the Authorities Bundle: see para. 22.1.2 of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide); and

(iii) if requested by the Court, a hard copy version of the Permission Hearing Bundle and Authorities Bundles.

(f) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, any party other than the Claimant intending to participate in the hearing must file and serve any skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages.

(g) If a party fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), (d) and/or (e), the Court may have regard to the failure when considering any question about costs at the hearing.

REASONS

(1) Anonymity: The Claimant (“C”) alleges that he is the victim of human trafficking, and has made a claim for international protection. The limited derogations from the principle of open justice in paragraph 1 are accordingly justified.

(2) Permission: The claim is unarguable, for the reasons which follow below.

(3) From the time that C arrived in the UK to the time that he was charged with offences under the Immigration Act 1971 (“the Act”), he provided no basis upon which any of the Defendants could or should have suspected that he may have been the victim of modern slavery or human trafficking.

(a) On 6 August 2024, C was detained on arrival in the UK by immigration officers on the reasonable grounds that he had been observed attempting to enter the UK illegally on a small boat (with around 30 others on board) which he was piloting, before the boat was intercepted.

(b) On 7 August 2024, he attended an asylum screening interview in which he made no allegation that he had been the victim of modern slavery. He answered in the negative to a question about whether he had ever been exploited (including being forced to carry out work, as he now claims he was forced to do in Libya). In particular, he gave no account of having been exploited or detained in Libya, saying simply that he had travelled to Libya on a visa and stayed there for a years and 2 months, and had worked as a butcher while in Libya. Moreover, he gave no account that he had been forced to pilot the boat from Calais by necessity: although he now says that, having paid smugglers to take him to the UK in the boat, he was abandoned by those smugglers mid-sea and was required to pilot the boat to stop it from sinking, he gave no such account at the time to immigration officers. (Nor had he given any such account to the Interforce Security Officer at [P/679], contrary to C’s Reply §17(5).)

(c) He was then arrested for immigration offences, conveyed to Margate Police Station, detained, found to be fit to be interviewed, and had a 30-minute consultation with his solicitor, following which he refused to attend for a PACE interview.

(d) The case was then referred for a charging decision; C’s solicitor made no representations in relation to this.

(e) On 8 August 2024, C was charged with offences under section 24(D1) and section 25 of the Act. He subsequently pleaded guilty at Thanet Magistrates Court to the section 24(D1) offence. The section 25 charge was discontinued after review.

(4) So far as the claim against the Secretary of State is concerned:

(a) Ground 1 is unarguable because:

(i) The screening interview provided no indication that C was the victim of modern slavery or trafficking. The questions asked in the screening interview were sufficiently broadly framed to allow any such claim to have been made. There was no irrational failure to make further enquiry at this stage.

(ii) The extent of enquiry did not end there. Immigration officers sought to interview C under caution, but he declined the interview after the benefit of a 30 minute consultation with his solicitor. Had he agreed to be interviewed, C could have advanced his account (had he wished to do so) as to why he was piloting the boat. It was not irrational or unlawful for the officers to seek authorisation to charge C in the absence of any further information, in circumstances where C was declining to provide it (even by way of a prepared statement).

(iii) In the circumstances, the SSHD is right to submit that there was no cause to investigate further whether C might have been exploited in Libya or on the Channel crossing. In particular, there was no obligation to interview other passengers of the boat to establish how C came to be piloting it, absent any such account from C himself.

(iv) For the same reason, there was no arguable breach by the SSHD of her policies or of the MOU in proceeding to apply for charging decision to be made in respect of C on the basis of the evidence against him. There was unquestionably sufficient evidence to charge him in respect of both offences, and to consider the aggravating circumstance of piloting the boat was present: officers had witnessed him doing so.

(v) As to the alleged “ongoing failure” to investigate, it was not arguably unlawful to fail to launch such an investigation where the Single Competent Authority was still considering whether or not to arrive at a positive Conclusive Grounds decision.

(b) Ground 2 is similarly unarguable against the SSHD. It appears to be premised upon evidence of “routine failure” in other cases to ask about the circumstances in which a person came to be piloting a boat. However, the live question is whether there was a failure in C’s case to do so. That is an impossible contention in his case, where he declined to be interviewed under caution. Even if there have been failures in other cases, that would not justify the grant of permission in this one.

(5) So far as the claim against the DPP is concerned, neither ground is arguable. There was nothing in the material present to the CPS for the purposes of the charging decision (or subsequent review) which should have led them to ask for further investigations to be made in respect of the possibility of modern slavery or human trafficking, for the same reasons as are set out above. The CPS’s approach did not amount to imposing a requirement on a victim of trafficking to self-identify; rather, it reflected the absence of any recorded indication that C was in fact such a victim.

(6) The claim against the CCKP is also unarguable. The custody officer plainly had sufficient evidence upon which to charge C, and had been authorised to do so by the CPS. He was entitled to rely upon the evidence gathered by the Immigration Officers for that purpose. Police officers were not required to launch their own independent investigation before such a decision could be taken.

(7) Since there is no arguable merit in either of the grounds against any of the Defendants, it is not necessary to consider the questions of delay or alternative remedy. They do, however, provide substantial further hurdles which would have had to be overcome in the event that there any arguable ground arising from the facts of this case.

(8) Link with Claim No AC-2025-LON-001362, R (KD) v SSHD and others: Since permission has been refused in this claim, I make no order joining this case with KD. However, if and to the extent that the application for permission is renewed in each case, those applications should be heard at the same time. Any such renewed permission hearing should be heard by the week commencing 26 January 2026, to allow the claims to catch up with the rolled-up hearing in KD, if and to the extent that any further permission is granted.

(9) Costs: The Secretary of State’s claimed costs are reasonable. No order for costs is made in respect of the Second and Third Defendants’ costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence, as neither filed a schedule setting out the amount claimed, contrary to paragraph 25.4.2 of the Administrative Court Guide 2025 (and its predecessors).

Signed: Robert Palmer KC

Date: 24 November 2025