December 22, 2025

PAL -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative Court High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-LON- 001970

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

29 November 2025

Before:

Richard Clayton KC,
sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

Between:

The King
on the application of
PAL

-v-

The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

On an application by the Claimant for an anonymity order, to apply for permission to bring proceedings for judicial review and to apply for extension of time for service of sealed claim form and relief from sanctions.

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and by the Defendant

ORDER OF RICHARD CLAYTON KC SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE

Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as PAL

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

The application for extension of time for service of sealed claim form and relief from sanctions. The application is granted and the Defendant must serve its Acknowledgement of Service no later than 21 days after the service of this Order and thereafter to put the papers before a Judge to consider whether to grant permission..

REASONS

Anonymity:
(1) The Claimant alleges that she is the victim of an offence of trafficking under Modern Slavery Act 2015, s. 2. Accordingly, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, s. 2(1)(db) applies so that by virtue of s. 1 of the Act, she is entitled to anonymity.

The decision subject to judicial review
(2) On 10 March 2025 the Defendant decided to apply a second Public Order Disqualification (“POD”) that denies the Claimant’s the protections to which she is otherwise entitled as a person in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe she is a victim of trafficking.

Factual background
(3) The Claimant entered the UK as a visitor on 6 May 2008 with her mother on a 6-month visitor visa and subsequently became an overstayer. On 15 February 2019, the First-tier Tribunal decided that the C’s removal from the UK would breach Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, resulting on 8 August 2019, in the Claimant being granted leave to remain for 30 months. On 18 November2022, the Claimant was granted further leave to remain ‘on the private life route’ until 19 May 2025.

(4) On 6 March 2023, the Claimant was is convicted of wounding with intent to do GBH and criminal damage. She already had a conviction for assaulting an emergency worker. On 9 May 2023, she was sentenced to 3 years detention, sentence will expire on 5 February 2026..

(5) On 22 June 2023, the Defendant made a decision that the Claimant should be deported and issued stage 1 deportation liability notice. On 15 September 2023, the Claimant made detailed representations to the Defendant to the effect that her deportation would breach Article 8 of the ECHR.

(6) On 14 November 2023,the Claimant’s solicitors requested that the Defendant refer the Claimant to the NRM as a potential victim of trafficking. On 23 November 2023, the Claimant was referred to the NRM and on 30 November 2023 the Claimant was made the subject of a positive reasonable grounds decision on the basis that she was subjected to (i) modern slavery when staying with her father; and (ii) sexual assault by her boyfriend and his friends [JR bundle.

(7) On 6 March 2024, the Defendant made a POD decision, inter alia, in respect of C’s referral to the NRM. Consequently, C is no longer entitled to modern slavery protection and support. On 08 April 2024, the Defendant decided that the Claimant’s deportation is conducive to the public good but removal would breach Article 8 ECHR; hence steps would not be taken to deport her. The parties exchanged pre- action correspondence for the Claimant’s first judicial review claim on 22 March 2024 and 17 May 2024. On 5 June 2024, AC-2024-LON-001903, the first claim was lodged. On 29 June 2024, Ritchie J refuses permission on the papers and on 5 September 2025, her solicitors lodged her renewal for an oral reconsideration. On 12 November 2024, Robin Knowles J granted permission to apply for JR at a hearing. On 5 December 2024, the parties lodged a consent order to withdraw, which then approved

(8) On 10 March 2025 the Defendant made a new POD decision which is the decision challenged by this JR claim/ On 26 April 2025, the Claimant gave birth to her son.

The Claimant’s application for judicial review
(9) In the Claim Form filed on 9 June 2025 the Claimant sough an order extending time to serve the Sealed Claim Form on the Defendant, and for the Defendant to file and serve her Acknowledgment of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence, as set out Since the Claimant issued on the last day of the three month period afforded by CPR 54.5(1), the Defendant complains that the claim was not brought promptly.

(10) On 19 June 2025 the Court office replied providing the fully sealed Claim Form (seal dated 17 June 2025). Unfortunately, due to an oversight, the solicitors did not serve this version of the Claim Form on the Defendant until 2 July 2025. At this time they wrote to the Defendant seeking to agree an order for an extension of time for service of the sealed Claim Form, with a corresponding extension of time for the Defendant to file her AOS and SGDs, so as to minimise Court time and expense. Unfortunately we have received no response from the Defendant to our proposal. As such we now are now making this application for the extensions of time with the proposed Consent Order standing as the Claimant’s draft order.

The application of the Denton principles
(11) The solicitors have apologised to the Court for the error in this case and have applied for relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9 by reference to the well known Denton principles which require the Court to consider three factors: to assess the seriousness of the breach, (2) to consider the reason for the breach, and (3) evaluating all circumstances to ensure justice.

The Claimant’s submissions in relation to relief from sanctions
(12) The Claimant’s solicitor in its letter to the Court on 19 August 2025 accepted the breach is serious given it is a failure to comply with CPR 54.7. As the Claimants’ instructed representatives on whom she relied in good faith, we apologise unreservedly to the Court for this breach.

(13) They also serve the witness statement of the William Shelley which indicates that this was due to oversights on the parts of the Claimant’s instructed representatives, who took immediate steps to serve the claim form upon becoming aware, and to seek the Defendant’s agreement to an extension before applying to the Court for an extension. The Claimant was at no point culpable to any degree, as she was held in prison and heavily pregnant / caring for a newborn child during the course of preparation for this application for judicial review.

(14) They make the following submission in relation to the other relevant circumstances and submit that the Claimant should have relief from sanctions.
a. the Defendant was served with a version of the Claim Form that, while not sealed, had been amended by the Court, along with the Court’s note to the Defendant in respect of the Claim containing the Court’s claim reference number, and the Claimant’s Permission Bundle. The Defendant was therefore in possession of the entirety of the judicial review claim.
b. They accept that under CPR 54.8(2) it is the Sealed Claim Form that is the key document that is required to be served in order for the claim to proceed and to trigger the Defendant’s obligations to respond to the claim.
c. They submit that, when on 2 July 2025 they discovered the issue, we immediately sought, in good faith, to resolve this matter by agreement with the Defendant pursuant to CPR 2.11.
d. They submit that she had not been materially prejudiced by the delay in service of the Sealed Claim Form and do not accept that the deprivation of a limitation defence is a compelling reason to deny this claim.
e. They further submit that The Claimant in this claim is a highly vulnerable young woman who has experienced considerable trauma in her life, including sexual assault on multiple occasions. The decision under challenge in this claim has the effect of depriving the Claimant access to support services that are specifically designed to address the effects of modern slavery and exploitation. The Claimant will suffer serious prejudice if her claim is struck out and she is left with no remedy to challenge the Defendant’s decision.
f. They also contend that the Claimant will likely pursue some kind of remedy as the public order disqualification is a continuing breach of her Article 4 ECHR rights

g. She will ask the Defendant to withdraw any new decision. If the Defendants fails to do so then

h. there will likely be a third judicial review of this decision.

(15) The Defendant’s submissions in relation to relief from sanctions
The Defendant objected to a retrospective application to extend time and submitted:
a. the Claimant was not filed promptly.
b. On 2 July 2025 the Claimant sent a copy of the sealed claim form to the Defendant notwithstanding that the last day for timely service of the claim form was 24 June 2025, which was 7 days after the claim form was issued on 17 June 2025.
c. She relied on at paragraph 41 of R (Good Law Project Lt) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355 the Court of Appeal explained the basis for the importance of valid service, referring to Woodward v Phoenix Healthcare Distribution Ltd:.
d. The deemed date of service is provided for in CPR 6.14 as the second business day after completion of the relevant step under rule 7.5(1).
e. Once the Claimant appreciated that she would be unable to comply with the time limit for the service of the sealed claim form prior to the expiry of the validity period she ought to have sought the Defendant’s written agreement stating the specific date it has been agreed the extension of time for service of the sealed claim form has been extended to and served the sealed claim form in accordance with the agreement. That was not the course that was followed.
f. The application for an extension of time was not made prospectively.
g. As to the relevant circumstances the Court should consider the Defendant submitted:
i. The Court should have regard to: (i) the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (ii) the need to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and court orders.
ii. There is no evidence before the case that the Claimant attempted to effect service of the sealed claim form at any time from 19 June 2025 to 24 June 2025.
iii. It appears from the Claimant’s application notice that no attempt was made between 19 June 2025 to 1 July 2025 to serve the sealed claim form on the Defendant. It also appears that the reason why the Claimant did not serve the sealed claim form within the specified period is that she (or her legal representatives) simply overlooked the matter.
iv. Exercising its discretion requires the court to have regard to the overriding objective which requires the application to be dealt with “justly”.
v. Where a Claimant does not seek to effect service until after the expiry of the validity period the Court should be much less likely to be granted an extension of time.

vi. All parties using the civil courts are obliged to comply with the CPR. The nature or subject-atter of a claim cannot affect the degree of compliance required.
vii. The Claimant issued her claim form at the very end of the limitation period and did not serve her sealed claim form until after the end of its period of validity. A Claimant who courts disaster in this way can only have a very limited claim on the Court’s indulgence in an application for a retrospective extension of time.
viii. It is unclear to the Defendant whether if the Claimant’s retrospective extension is granted the Claimant would seek to recover his costs from the Defendant in respect of the additional cost of preparing the application notice, paying the court fee and preparing the draft order and advising the Claimant regarding the application or whether these costs would be bourne by the Claimant herself. To the extent that the Claimant seeks to recover the costs of this application from the Defendant it is submitted that the Defendant would be prejudiced by paying for an application that was not of her own making.
ix. If the Court granted the relief sought the Defendant would suffer prejudice because she would be deprived of any limitation defence that has accrued. In the absence of valid service the Defendant is not subject to the court’s jurisdiction in this matter.

My ruling on whether to give relief from sanctions
(16) The Claimant accepts that its breach is serious and does not seek to argue there is a justified reason for the breach. The only issue that is vigorously contested is the third limb of Denton.

(17) CPR 3.9 requires that, in every case, the court will consider “all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application”. Two circumstances which are specifically mentioned in r.3.9 are (a) the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and (b) the need to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and court orders, referred to in Denton as factors (a) and (b). The court stated that factor (a) makes it clear that the court must consider the effect of the breach in every case. If the breach has prevented the court or the parties from conducting the litigation (or other litigation) efficiently and at proportionate cost, that will be a factor weighing in favour of refusing relief. Factor (b) emphasises the importance of complying with rules, practice directions and orders. The court observed that this factor received insufficient attention in the past. However, the old lax culture of non-compliance is no longer tolerated.

(18) As the Defendant contends, the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost is an important factor. In my judgment factor (b) has a significant weight when considering the all the circumstances of the case so as to deal with the Claimant’s application justly. I also bear in mind that the Claimant’s solicitors filed these proceedings on the last day of the 3 month back stop permitted by CPR 54.5(1). Against those factors I have regard to the Defendant’s recognition that the Claimant

(19) is a person in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe she is a victim of trafficking who, therefore, has a high need for ‘modern slavery specific protections because she is vulnerable. I also note that there is no evidence that the Claimant, herself, is blameworthy for the difficulties that have arisen here.

(20) Furthermore, on the face of it, the Claimant’s grounds of challenge in these proceedings (both individually and cumulatively) appear (at least provisionally) to raise some legal issues of wider public importance. She submits, in summary, that:
a. the Statutory Guidance and the POD frustrate the statutory purpose;
b. the Statutory Guidance fetters the Secretary of State’s discretion;
c. the Statutory Guidance is unlawful as promoting breach of article 4 ECHR;
d. the adverse decision breaches article 4 ECHR;
e. there is a legally erroneous conclusion that the C is not at real and immediate risk of being trafficked;
f. the decision, itself, is irrational;
g. it contravenes Equality Act 2010, s. 29(6);
h. it discriminates contrary to article 14 of the ECHR; and
i. It breaches the public sector equality duty.

(20) Unfortunately, I do not have the benefit of any submissions the Defendant might wish to make as to the viability of the Claimant’s grounds.

(21) In my judgment the question of whether all the circumstances of the case, enable the court to deal justly with this application is finely balanced. Nonetheless, I have concluded that the gravity of the consequences for the Claimant in all the circumstances of the case (particularly because of her high need for modern slavery specific protections and her vulnerability) tip the scales having regard to all of the particular circumstances of this case so as to deal with this application justly.

(22) Accordingly, I grant relief from sanctions and order the Defendant to file and serve her Acknowledgment of Service no later than 21 days after service of this Order in order that a Judge consider whether the Claimant’s grounds for judicial reviews are realistically arguable.

Signed: RICHARD CLAYTON KC SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
Date: 29 November 2025