PR -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)
Immigration and Asylum Chamber (Upper Tribunal)Anonymity Order
Case number: JR-2025-BHM-000082
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review
21 July 2025
Before:
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Between:
The King
on the application of
PR
(Anonymity direction made)
-v-
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Order
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (UT rule 30(1))
Following consideration of the documents lodged by the applicant and the Acknowledgement of Service filed by the respondent
Order by Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds:
Permission is refused
Reasons
(1) The applicant seeks to challenge the decision made by the respondent dated 5 February 2025 in which the respondent certified the applicant’s asylum and human rights claim as clearly unfounded pursuant to section 94 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
(2) The applicant’s immigration history is set out in the papers and the AOS. The applicant entered the UK on a student visa on 17 September 2022. On 13 November 2023, the applicant’s visa was curtailed due to notification by the University that the applicant had failed to register for the current academic year. On 23 January 2024, the applicant claimed asylum. On 5 February 2025, the applicant’s asylum claim was refused and certified as clearly unfounded under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
(3) The application is out of time. Rule 28(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal Rules) 2008 provides that the application must be filed promptly and, in any event, not later than 3 months after the decision to which the Application relates. As set out in the chronology, the decision under challenge was made on 5 February 2025 and the claim was made on 2 June 2025. The claim was therefore not made promptly and was in any event out of time. I have applied the 3 stage approach identified in the cases of Denton, Mitchell and Hysaj as follows. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply with the rules. The focus should be on whether the breach has been serious or significant. If a judge concludes that a breach is not serious or significant, then relief will usually be granted and it will usually be unnecessary to spend much time on the second or third stages; but if the judge decides that the breach is serious or significant, then the second and third stages assume greater importance. ii) The second stage is to consider why the failure occurred, that is to say whether there is a good reason for it. iii) The third stage is to evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application.
I am satisfied that there is serious and significant delay in bringing this application as evidenced by the chronology set out above. Whilst the applicant has applied for an extension of time on the basis of not receiving the decision letter until 15 April 2025, the material set out at Annex 1 demonstrates that the decision was sent to the email address provided by the applicant and that it was successfully delivered. There has been no explanation in the application for extension of time why the email had not been accessed given that it was successfully delivered. It is completely silent on that aspect.
(4) In any event, it has not been demonstrated by the grounds as they are set out that there is any public law error in the decision reached by the respondent. It is not clear from the grounds what public law errors are in fact asserted. The statement of grounds set out between paragraphs 27 – 42 fail to particularise what public law errors are advanced. In the circumstances, the following points appear to be raised from those paragraphs.
(5) Insofar as the grounds challenge the issue of sufficiency of protection and on the basis that they respondent failed to undertake an adequate assessment of sufficiency protection ( see paragraphs 28, 32, 34 and 38) the grounds are not arguable. Insofar as respondent considered her claim, the respondent’s undertook an assessment of sufficiency of protection between paragraphs 25 -35 in the context of the objective country evidence referenced in the decision letter and in the light of the applicant’s factual claim alongside the correct legal test in Horvath and the respondent was entitled to take into account all the circumstances of the applicant’s claim, including the factual background given by her as to the potential perpetrators identified as members of her family and their asserted influence. Those identified were non-state actors and the applicant was not able to demonstrate in her factual account that those she claimed to fear had the power and influence to cause harm to the applicant wherever she lived in India ( see paragraphs 30-31 of the decision letter) as it had not been demonstrated that they had any such influence either local or national level; the applicant was not able to identify or give evidence of any links (question 72), the applicant never met those concerned knowledge contacted her (Q85). It was rational and lawful for the respondent to take into account that the applicant had failed to demonstrate the non-state actors identified had the influence to locate the appellant as this is relevant to the issue of risk of harm and sufficiency of protection and was entitled to conclude that on the factual claim made that she would be able to access protection from the authorities.
(6) As to the issue of internal relocation, the respondent properly considered that the applicant and her family would be able to relocate to another part of India ( see paragraphs 36-54 )and did so by taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances ( paragraph 43) but also that she had not demonstrated that those
she feared had the influence or motivation or ability to locate her and her family members throughout India. The applicant herself has had no contact with her family for 4 years.
(7) The grounds (paragraphs 30 and 31) assert that the respondent failed to consider the best interests of the child. The grounds are not arguable. The best interests were expressly considered between paragraphs 71 and 72 in the decision letter, taking into account the age of the child, the lack of family in the UK and the relevant family circumstances and was entitled to conclude that the best interests of the child would be to remain with the parents and that they would be able to return to another part of India as a family unit.
(8) The decision properly considered all the information advanced by the applicant with the application and the Secretary of State correctly directed herself to the appropriate threshold for certifying a claim as clearly unfounded. It is unarguable that the respondent did not consider the claim rationally and in accordance with the law. It is not arguable that the respondent’s decision was not within the range of reasonable responses properly open to her. She considered all the evidence in the round, and with anxious scrutiny and took into account all the relevant circumstances. Consequently, the correct test was applied and that the Secretary of State was arguably entitled to conclude that the application was lacking in substance and would be bound to fail.
(9) The time limit for challenging this Order under Rule 30 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 is 9 days from the date of sending this Order.
Costs
(10) The applicant will pay the respondent’s costs of £1526, subject to any representations in writing to be received within 9 days of the date on which this order is sent.
Reasons
(11) The applicant has not succeeded in her claim and the respondent has incurred the costs of defending the claim and in the absence of any further representations should be entitled to recover these.
Anonymity:
(12) Whilst the application has been refused, as a precautionary measure in light of paragraph 9 above and that the facts of the claim involve a protection claim, I make an anonymity order pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the applicant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the applicant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
(13) The order can be varied or discharged on application by either party upon notice.
Signed: Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Dated: 21/7/25