R (DM) -v- Cardiff City Council (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case Number: AC-2023-CDF-00094

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

Before:
Deputy Chamber President Tudur sitting as a High Court Judge

In the matter of an application for judicial review

The King
on the application of DM
-v-
Cardiff City Council

Order

On an application by the Claimant for Permission and for an Interim Order

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and no Acknowledgement of Service having been filed by the Defendant

ORDER by Deputy Chamber President Tudur sitting as a High Court Judge

  1. Pursuant to CPR rule 39.2(4) the Claimant, who states that he is a child aged 17 shall be afforded anonymity and be referred to as “DM”. The identity of the Claimant shall not be disclosed outside of these proceedings. It shall not be disclosed in any report of the proceedings the name of the Claimant or any details leading to the identification of the Claimant;
  2. Pursuant to CPR rule 5.4C a person who is not a party to the proceedings may obtain a copy of a statement of case, judgment or order from the court records only if the statement of case, judgment or order has been anonymised such that:
    a. the Claimant is referred to in those documents only as “DM”;
    b. that any identifying reference to the Claimant be deleted from those documents;
  3. The application for permission to seek judicial review is refused.
  4. No order for costs

Reasons

  1. The Claimant submits that he is a child who will turn 18 years by his own admission on the 20 June 2024. It is appropriate for the Claimant to be anonymised in the proceedings to protect his interests.
  2. The application purports to challenge a decision not to disclose an age assessment decision relating to the Claimant on the basis that it was irrational or unlawful.
  3. It is not arguable that the decision was irrational or unlawful, where the Claimant has not provided to the Defendant a reasonable opportunity to produce a copy of the age assessment report.
  4. An initial request for a copy of the short form age assessment was sent to the Defendant on the 9 August 2023 and stated that the assessment had been undertaken between the 10 and 31 July 2023.
  5. The statement of facts and grounds states that the assessment was undertaken on a date between July and August 2023 but confirms that the initial email request for a copy of the age assessment referred to the assessment being completed on or around the 3 or 4 August 2023.
  6. The witness statement of Stuart Luke dated 18 August 2023 states at paragraph 3 that the age assessment was undertaken between May and July 2023.
  7. The pre-action protocol letter identified the date of assessment as the 3 or 4 August 2023, suggesting that the initial request was made within a week of the assessment. The letter, which was dated the 14 August 2023, set out as part of the factual background that the Defendant was afforded until 4pm on the 16 August 2023 for a response and in paragraph 12 of the letter, the proposed reply date for a substantive response was 4pm on the 14 August 2023, which was the same day as the letter was sent to the Defendant.
  8. No response was received to the pre-action protocol letter and no acknowledgement of service or response to the claim has been received.
  9. It is well established in case law that a copy of the age assessment decision should be available within a reasonable time: R (Amufrijeva) v SSHD [2003] UKHL at 15: “Any implied duty would be to give notice within a reasonable time” and in the same paragraph it is acknowledged that there will be a delay between making the decision and sending out a written copy.
  10. In this case, where the requests were unclear about the date of the assessment and the time provided for a response to the request was very short, it is not arguable in the circumstances that the Defendant’s failure to provide a copy was irrational or unlawful.