R on the application of ABE -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)
Claim no: AC-2024-LON-003317
In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
8 October 2024
Before:
Hon. Mr Justice Dexter Dias
Between:
The King on the application of
ABE
-v-
Secretary of State for the Home Department
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ANONYMITY ORDER
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On an application by the Claimant for urgent consideration, interim relief and directions
Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant
ORDER by the Hon. Mr Justice Dexter Dias
- Anonymity
(a) Under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and pursuant to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
(i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be (ii) disclosed in any proceedings in public.
(ii) The Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as “ABE”.
(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
(c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
(i) the parties must within 7 days file and serve a redacted copy of any statement of case already filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;
(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time and must then be served with the unredacted version;
(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.
2.Prohibitory injunction:
(a) The Defendant must not disperse the claimant from her current accommodation unless it is to female-only single-room accommodation until the application for interim relief is determined by the court on an on-notice basis (the application presently before the court being without notice) and after the defendant has been granted an opportunity to respond.
(b) The Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraph 2(a) above, any such application to be served on each party
THIS IS A PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(b) ABOVE. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. SEE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDE 2024, §17.7.4
3. Timetable for submissions and paper decision on interim relief:
a) The Defendant may file and serve any response to the application for interim
relief by 4 pm, Friday 11 October 2024.
(b) The Claimant may file and serve a reply to that response by 4 pm, Tuesday 15 October 2024.
(c) The papers are to be referred to a judge or deputy judge for a decision whether
to grant interim relief as soon as possible thereafter.
REASONS
Anonymity: The claimant is a putative victim of Forced Marriage, domestic violence and abuse. There are accordingly compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice in paragraph 1.
Prohibitory injunction: I consider the two-limb interim relief test set out in R (Medical Justice) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 1425 (Admin), paras 6-13. On Limb 1, there is plainly a serious issue to be tried and it at least arguable that on the material presently before the court that the defendant has accepted that the specific vulnerability of the claimant necessitates accommodation that is female-only and single-occupation. This engages an arguable substantive legitimate expectation claim.
As to Limb 2, the fragile emotional functioning and psychological state of the claimant entail to that the balance of convenience (which is in reality a balance of prejudice) falls clearly in favour of maintaining the status quo pending response from the defendant. While the prohibition on the claimant’s dispersal is an administrative inconvenience to the defendant, it is clearly outweighed at this initial interim stage by the serious potential adverse consequences that may accrue to the claimant.
Therefore, both limbs of Medical Justice fall in favour of the claimant