Rex -v- Mensah, English and others (anonymity order)

Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey)Anonymity Order

Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey)

5 June 2025

Before:

Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb DBE

Before:

Rex

-v-

Mensah

English

and others

Order

  1. The prosecution makes an application for anonymity for a single witness identified thus far as CN1084. The application is supported by an open report from Detective Superintendent Luke Williams, Counter-Terrorism Policing dated 23 December 2024.
  2. Further relevant information is found in a detailed closed ‘Damage Assessment’ provided to me. I have considered it and am satisfied that it should not be made available to the defence. I have borne well in mind that I have not had any submissions on the content from any defence advocate and have exercised the necessary caution in drawing conclusions from it.
  3. The application is pursuant to Part 3 Chapter 2 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Rules 18.18 and 18.19 of the Criminal Procedure Rules and it is in respect of a counterterrorism police officer who is the officer in the case. He will present the timeline evidence. s.86 of the Act permits the court to make the further measures sought to give effect to the anonymity order in this case namely, the use of a cypher instead of the witnesses name, screening from the public gallery, entry and exit out of public view and, the necessary adjunct, that no questions may be asked which would tend to identify the witness. The prosecution has also invited the court to exercise its discretion not to be told the identity of the witness, pursuant to s.87(2)(e).
  4. The statutory requirements are that I should be satisfied the order is necessary, condition A; that the order is consistent with a fair trial, condition B; that the evidence is sufficiently important to require it to be adduced and the court is satisfied either the witness would not testify without anonymity or there would be real harm to the public interest if the witness testified without the order being made. In this case condition C, the last of the three conditions, is in effect close to condition A. Plainly, it is necessary for a well-informed officer to present the timeline.
  5. The application says that the public interest underpinning it, namely the protection of functionality of counterterrorism policing within the context of state threat activity, is not particular to this case or these defendants. It is said that it applies across all cases where individuals within counter terrorism policing are engaged in investigation and trials. Regardless, such applications must be scrutinised case by case and this is the approach I have taken.
  6. I bear in mind the issues in this case as delineated in the defence statements. With apology for the succinct precis; Mensah’s defence is that he didn’t start the fire and was unaware of a risk to anyone, English says he drove three men to where the fire was set but had no idea what they were doing, Rose accepts setting the fire but does not accept awareness of any risk to life, Asmena admits being in English’s car on the journey but denies knowledge or involvement, Paulauskas thought Reeves was fantasising or fabricating and Evans didn’t realise he had any relevant information to pass on. It is clear that there is no challenge to the work or approach of the investigating police officers. There is no objection to this application, and I’ve heard no representations from any
    defence counsel or member of the press. However, I am well aware from my work, including in other cases where national security and CTP concerns have led to applications, successful or otherwise, for anonymity, of the arguments than can be made properly against the anonymisation of police officers. I have those in mind.
  7. In making the application the prosecution has considered the attorney general’s guidelines on the overarching principles. Plentiful notice has been given. As already noted, the application is supported by a statement from Det Supt Luke Williams who has also read the Damage Assessment provided ex parte to me. He confirms that there would be substantial damage to national security and counterterrorism policing’s ability to keep the public safe in the absence of the measures sought by the prosecution. It is his view, which does not replace the court’s own consideration of the matter, that the damage that would be caused were this application unsuccessful would comfortably outweigh the public interest in disclosure of the officer’s identity.
  8. Nonetheless, witness anonymity is contrary to the spirit of a transparent criminal justice system and, as the Court of Appeal has stated in clear terms it is a special measure of the last practicable resort. Open justice is much more important than may be apparent in a single trial. The fact that justice is administered in a court to which the public have access and when each defendant knows who makes the allegations against him and why, is one of the ways that our system endeavours to prevent miscarriages of justice and misbehaviour by those in power, whether they be police officers or not. It is important that applications such as these are not granted without close scrutiny, and they should be tested by those impacted by the court order.
  9. I have looked carefully at the considerations set out in s.89(2) And all other matters that occur to me. This is a case in which the general right of a defendant to know the identity of a witness in the trial will be extinguished in the case of this particular officer however the witness’s credibility is not in question, the witness is not giving sole or decisive evidence implicating any defendant and it is not been suggested to me that the witness’s evidence cannot be properly tested under conditions of anonymity. Finally, the prosecution is under a solemn duty to bring to the court’s attention any matters which undermine credibility, reliability or honesty and I have seen none. I accept that the decision to make this application has been considered at a sufficiently senior level in the CPS, it
    is presented by senior leading counsel, and I do not find that it is in any sense an application made lightly, by rote or as routine.
  10. Decision. Obviously, the operational capabilities of counterterrorism policing are of the utmost importance to preserving the safety and security of the citizens of the United Kingdom. State threat actors realistically have the capability to harm counterterrorism policing, and it is the responsibility of the courts to do what can be done fairly and properly within the law, to prevent that harm. In this case two defendants Dylan Earl and Jake Samuel Reeves have pleaded guilty to aggravated arson and offences which involved respectively, preparatory conduct contrary to s.18 National Security Act 2023 on behalf of the Wagner Group (a proscribed paramilitary group closely connected to the Russian state) and accepting a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service contrary to s.17 of the Act. I am sure that identification of individual officers in the trial would risk significant harm being done to the effectiveness of counter terrorism efforts in this country. Two examples of the kind of harm will suffice. The possession of a name, in these days of effective and wide-ranging computer analysis enables states hostile to the UK to seek further information about any individual and those connected to them, and to attempt to monitor, compromise or threaten them. It also potentially removes the ability of that individual to work in areas where their name can safely be given because they cannot be identified as a counter terrorism police officer and so on.
  11. I am satisfied that anonymity in the particular facts of this case is consistent with a fair trial, it is necessary to prevent serious harm to the national security interests of the UK by the identity of officers who take significant roles in the preparation and management of serious criminal investigations and trials becoming known and that it should be granted because it is necessary to ensure that real harm to the public interest does not occur. There is no better alternative way to protect the officer and the important public interest engaged in this application.
  12. However, I decline to exercise my discretion not to be told the identity of the witness. This is a further step clouding transparent justice and I can see no reason for such a direction. The identity of the officer will be disclosed to me in some suitable manner before their evidence starts.
  13. In due course I will direct the jury that the use of a cypher has been permitted simply to protect an officer who does sensitive work and arises from that occupation rather than because of any risk from these defendants.