Southern Housing -v- Tracey Martin

County CourtJudgment

    Claim No. L00DA612

    In the County Court at Dartford

    Monday 27 October 2025

    Before:

    Deputy District Judge Anderson

    Between:

    Southern Housing

    -v-

    Tracey Martin

    Note of Judgment

    BACKGROUND

    1. On 13 August 2024, following a hearing before District Judge Chown, the Claimant was granted an injunction (“the Injunction”) against the Defendant, Ms Tracey Martin, which provided that she is:
      “Forbidden (whether by herself of by instructing, encouraging or allowing any other person) from actions or behaviour that may cause harassment, alarm or distress and/or housing related nuisance or annoyance within or in the vicinity of Cambria Court, North Star Boulevard, Greenhithe, Kent DA9 9UG including but not limited to the following:
      a. Acting or inciting others to act in an anti-social manner which causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household.
      b. Shouting, including but not limited to swearing, screaming, stomping, banging, so as to be audible outside 19 Cambria Court, North Star, Greenhithe, Kent DA9 9UG.
      c. Acting in a threatening manner, including but not limited to threatening to kill, any resident of Cambria Court, North Star, Greenhithe, Kent DA9 9UG.”
      The Injunction included a power of arrest.
    2. The Claimant served the Injunction on the Defendant on 18 October 2024 and it took effect from that date, until 12 August 2025.
    3. On 3 March 2025, the Claimant made an application for contempt against the Defendant, in which the Claimant listed some 6 alleged incidents of breach of the Injunction between 16 October 2024 and 18 November 2024.
    4. On 27 May 2025, and before the Claimant’s application had been heard, the Defendant was arrested and brought before District Judge OmoRegie at this court, following a further alleged breach of the Injunction. The case was adjourned to 23 June 2025, to allow the Claimant time to file and serve the evidence on which it wished to rely and for the Defendant to seek legal advice and to file any evidence on which she might wish to rely (whilst the Judge also made it clear that she did not need to file any evidence and that she had the right to remain silent, whilst reminding her of her rights generally).
    5. Unfortunately, the Defendant did not attend the hearing on 23 June 2025, despite the Judge waiting nearly an hour beyond the start time for the hearing. Having considered the criteria set out in the case of Sanchez v Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam), District Judge OmoRegie decided to take the exceptional course of hearing the case in the Defendant‘s absence and he found that the allegations made against the Defendant relating to her behaviour on 27 May were made out, so that she had breached the Injunction. He adjourned the claim for sentencing.
    6. The case came back before the Court on 16 September 2025, before Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald, for the purposes of determining the sentence to be imposed on the Defendant following the finding of breach at the hearing on 23 June 2025, and to determine the further allegations of breach set out in the Claimant’s application dated 3 March 2025.
    7. Unfortunately, the Defendant once again failed to attend that hearing and Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald again considered the criteria set out in the Sanchez case and decided to proceed in the Defendant’s absence. Having considered the evidence before the Court, the Judge found that all 45 of the allegations against the Defendant were made out and she then proceeded to consider the appropriate sentence not only for those breaches but also the breach found by District Judge OmoRegie at the hearing on 23 June 2025. Having considered the matrix set out in the case of Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, the Judge imposed a 4-month sentence relating to the breach that occurred on 27 May 2025 and a further 3-month sentence for the 45 breaches established at the hearing on 16 September 2025, with both sentences to run concurrently and to be suspended for a period of 18 months from that date. Finally, Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald made an order to extend the term of the Injunction to 12 August 2026.
    8. Following the hearing, on 8 October 2025, the Claimant served a copy of the Order and the Injunction as amended on the Defendant. In the covering letter, the Claimant explained the terms of the Order, including the fact that the period of the Injunction had been extended and that the Defendant could be sent to prison if she breached the terms of the Injunction again before 17 March 2027.
    9. Despite this warning, on 19 October 2025 the Defendant’s neighbour, Ms Stacey Thompson, reported that the Defendant has been banging and shouting sufficiently loudly that Ms Thompson and her guests present in her flat could hear the Defendant. Ms Thompson called the police and emailed the Claimant that evening, to report the incident. On 21 October 2025, the police attended the Defendant’s flat and arrested her for breach of the Injunction. The Defendant was brought to court and appeared before Deputy District Judge Morrell, who reminded the Defendant of her rights and gave directions for the service of evidence and for the proceedings to be listed for trial on 27 October 2025, at 10am. The Judge also agreed to bail the Defendant on condition that she attend the hearing on the 27th.
    10. Following that hearing, the Claimant wrote to the Defendant to confirm the terms of the order made by Deputy District Judge Morrell, including the date of the trial. The Claimant also reminded the Defendant of her rights to get legal advice and enclosed the evidence on which the Claimant would be relying at the hearing on 27 October.
    11. Unfortunately, and despite the fact that the Defendant knew that she was obliged to attend the hearing today, not least because it was a term of her bail granted on 21 October 2025, she failed to attend court. Having waited for just over 1 hour beyond the listed start time, and having checked that the Defendant had been sent details of the hearing, I called the case on at 11.02am.

    ISSUES FOR MY CONSIDERATION

    1. In terms of the issues for my consideration today, I was ably assisted by the submissions of Ms Rai of Counsel, who submitted that I should consider each of the following in turn:
      12.1 Whether I should proceed today in the absence of the Defendant.
      12.2 If I was prepared to proceed, whether the allegation of breach arising from the incident reported on 19 October 2025 was made out.
      12.3 If the allegation was made out, whether I should then proceed to sentencing, in the Defendant’s absence.
      12.4 If I was prepared to proceed to sentencing today, what sentence should be imposed for a further breach of the Injunction.
      12.5 Whether I should activate the suspended sentences imposed by Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald on 16 September 2025.

    ISSUE 1 – SHOULD I PROCEED TODAY?

    1. In considering whether I should proceed today, like District Judge OmoRegie and Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald before me, I have taken account of the relevant consideration set out by Mr Justice Cobb in the Sanchez case, including:
      13.1 Whether the Defendant had been served with the relevant documents, including the hearing notice.
      13.2 Whether the Defendant had sufficient notice to enable her to prepare for the hearing.
      13.3 Whether there was any good reason advanced for her lack of attendance.
      13.4 Whether, by reference to the nature and circumstances of her behaviour, the Defendant has waived her right to be present, for example because she had demonstrated herself to be indifferent to the consequences of the case proceeding in her absence.
      13.5 Whether an adjournment would be likely to secure her attendance.
      13.6 the extent of the disadvantage to the Defendant in not being able to present her case.
      13.7 whether any undue prejudice would be caused to the Claimant by the delay.
      13.8 whether any undue prejudice would be caused to the forensic process if the application proceeded in her absence.
      13.9 the overriding objective, including the obligation of the court to deal with cases ’justly’, ‘expeditiously and fairly’.
    2. In considering each of the factors, Ms Rai drew my attention to the following points:
      14.1 The Defendant was definitely made aware of the need to attend the hearing today, as she was present at the hearing on 21 October, when the court made it clear that she had to attend.
      14.2 In case the Defendant was not aware of the hearing date, or the need to attend, the Claimant wrote to her by both email and post on 22 October 2025, making it clear when the hearing would take place and that she needed to attend.
      14.3 The Defendant had not been in contact with the Claimant (or the court) to say that she couldn’t attend for any reason.
      14.4 The Defendant’s ongoing breaches of the injunction were causing serious harm to her neighbours, and it would be unduly prejudicial to them to delay this matter further, particularly in circumstances where this was the third occasion on which Ms Martin had failed to attend court despite being ordered to do so.
    3. To these factors I would add that, given her failures to attend either the 23 June hearing or the 16 September hearing, despite the significance of both hearings, it seems to me highly unlikely that adjourning the hearing today would have the effect of securing the Defendant’s attendance and on that basis, I found that I should take the exceptional course or proceeding to hear the case in her absence.

    ISSUE 2 – DID THE DEFENDANT BREACH THE INJUNCTION ON 19 OCTOBER 2025?

    1. In order to consider this issue, I have had the benefit of reading 3 affidavits prepared on behalf of the Claimant and sworn by Stacey Thompson, Riley Rose and Emma Beveridge. I have also had to benefit of listening to 2 recordings made by Ms Thompson on the evening of 19 October, on which shouting and banging can be heard. Ms Thompson lives in the flat below the Defendant. It was the evidence of all 3 witnesses that, on 19 October, they were in Ms Thompson’s flat, celebrating her son, Mr Riley’s 18th birthday. Their evidence was that, at 6.30pm, the Defendant started banging on the floor that separates her flat from that of Ms Thompson and shouting loudly. According to Ms Thompson, she continued to make this noise until about 9pm. When the noise started, Ms Thompson made the 2 sound recordings to which I have listened, at about 6.40pm, and then called the police at 6.47pm.
    2. The Defendant has not submitted any evidence to the Court to contradict the Claimant’s evidence on what happened on the evening of 19 October (and nor is she obliged to do so, given her right to silence). In the absence of any such evidence, I am still obliged to consider whether the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof in this case, given that I must be satisfied that the allegations are proven to a criminal standard of proof, such that I am sure the incident occurred as alleged by the Claimant. Having considered the affidavits and the sound recordings, I am so satisfied. The Defendant has breached paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Injunction.

    ISSUE 3 – SHOULD I PROCEED TO SENTENCING

    1. I have considered whether it would be appropriate to proceed to sentencing at this point, rather than adjourning to a further date, to allow the Defendant to attend. I note that this was the approach taken by District Judge OmoRegie at the hearing on 23 June 2025, but that the Defendant then failed to attend the adjourned hearing on 16 September 2025, despite the fact she was advised that the Judge at that later hearing would be considering what sentence should be imposed on her relating to the breach found by District Judge OmoRegie.
    2. In the circumstances, it is highly unlikely that any adjournment of today’s hearing would secure the Defendant’s attendance at another hearing. To adjourn the proceedings again will not only incur further costs for the Claimant and use further court time but will also delay the conclusion of these proceedings, and will potentially prolong the harm that Ms Thompson and the other tenants at Cambria Court have been suffering as a result of the Defendant’s ongoing disregard for the terms of the Injunction. I therefore find that I should proceed to sentencing today.

    ISSUE 4 – WHAT SENTENCE SHOULD I IMPOSE FOR THIS FURTHER BREACH?

    1. Ms Rai made helpful submissions on the sentence that should be imposed, taking into account the test set out in the case of Lovett v Wigan Borough Council to which I have referred earlier.
    2. On the question on culpability, Ms Rai submitted that I should regard the Defendant’s conduct as at least category B, falling between a minor breach and a very serious breach, because this was a deliberate breach of the Injunction, the terms of which had been brought to the Defendant’s attention just 11 days before, when the Claimant had served a copy of the Order from the hearing on 16 September and had explained in terms what that Order meant. Ms Rai also submitted that I should take into account the fact the Defendant had already been found to have breached the Injunction on 46 other occasions, given the findings on District Judge OmoRegie on 23 June 2025 and of Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald on 16 September 2025, so that it might be appropriate to regard this as a Category A case, for a very serious breach or persistent serious breaches.
    3. On that point, I should state that I have not taken into account the previous breaches for which the Defendant has already been sentenced, as another Judge has already considered the penalty that should be imposed relating to those breaches. However, I have considered the fact that this further breach came just days after the Defendant had been reminded of the need to comply with the terms of the Injunction, and I find that her continued failure to comply with its terms does put this case at the top end of Category B.
    4. Turning to the issue of harm, Ms Rai submitted that I should regard this at least as category 2 and possibly category 1, given the ongoing risk of the Defendant failing to comply with the Injunction and causing further distress to her neighbours. Both Mr Riley and Ms Beveridge gave evidence about the impact the events on 19 October had on Ms Thompson, who they described as anxious and on edge, with Ms Beveridge going on to say that she has known Ms Thompson for 13 years and she had never seen her look as anxious as she did that evening. Whilst I do acknowledge the impact this event will have had on Ms Thompson, and her guests, I find that this is not sufficient to fall into the Category of “very serious harm”, and I find that the appropriate category is Category 2.
    5. Having reached those finding, the sentencing guidelines suggest that the starting point for any sentence should be 12 weeks’ custody, subject to any adjustment for aggravating and mitigating factors.
    6. In this case, the only evidence before me that might mitigate the Defendant’s culpability is the issue of her own mental health and whether that might be the cause of her ongoing failure to abide by the terms of the injunction. Indeed, I have considered whether this might be a reason to delay sentencing, to get medical evidence on the question of her mental state. However, Ms Rai advises me that the Claimant has been similarly concerned and is aware that the Defendant has been referred for an assessment, but (as with these proceedings) she has refused to engage. A further adjournment to consider this question is therefore unlikely to serve any purpose.
    7. Since the Defendant has not engaged in the proceedings, there is no admission or plea that might serve to lead to a reduction in sentence. As to the issue of aggravation, Ms Rai suggested that the fact there have been so many incidences ought to act as an aggravating factor. Again, my view is that Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald has already taken that fact into consideration when imposing a 4-month sentence on the Defendant in relation to the multiple breaches found at the hearing on 16 September 2025. I have therefore not taken those facts into consideration when deciding what sentence should apply for the breach of the Injunction on 19 October 2025, and I find that a custodial sentence of 12 weeks is justified in this case.
    8. Whilst I have concluded that the custody threshold has been passed in this case, I must still consider whether an immediate sentence of imprisonment is appropriate or whether that sentence should be suspended. When looking at this point, I see that, at the hearing on 16 September 2025, Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald noted that it was possible that the Defendant would be evicted from the property and that the other residents would be protected by that step. However, the Defendant remains in residence and continues to breach the Injunction. The Judge also considered that the Defendant ought to be given a further opportunity to comply with the terms of the Injunction, such that a suspended sentence would be appropriate. Sadly, it seems that the Defendant was not prepared to take the opportunity given to her and I therefore find that the sentence of 12 weeks’ imprisonment should take immediate effect.

    ISSUE 5 – SHOULD I ACTIVATE THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE

    1. As I have noted, the sentences imposed by Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald were suspended in the hope that the Defendant would change her behaviour, and it was a specific condition of the sentence passed on 16 September 2025 that she should comply with the terms of the injunction. Since she has failed to meet that condition, I find that the suspended sentences should be activated, such that the Defendant should now be imprisoned for a period of 4 months for the breach that occurred on 27 May 2025 and for 3 months for the 45 breaches found at the hearing on 16 September 2025, with both sentences to run concurrently.
    2. This raises the question on whether the sentence of 12 weeks’ imprisonment I have imposed as a result of the further breach of the Injunction on 19 October 2025 should run concurrently with the 4-month sentence already imposed, or whether it should run consecutively. Ms Rai submitted that the sentence should be consecutive, because of the repeated failure by the Defendant to comply with the terms of the Injunction. Having said that, she acknowledged that I would have to stand back and apply the totality principle, to consider whether an overall sentence of 4 months and a further 12 weeks would be proportionate.
    3. In considering this point, I have noted that the purpose of sentencing is to ensure future compliance with orders, as well as for punishment and rehabilitation, and that the sentence to be imposed should be the shortest sentence possible to achieve those aims. In my view, a sentence of 7 months would be disproportionate in this case. I would hope that any kind of custodial sentence will cause the Defendant to realise that her conduct has been unacceptable and that she must continue to comply with the Injunction, so long as it remains in force (and assuming that the Claimant is not already taking steps to seek possession of the property, such that she will not be living there when she is released from prison).
    4. I therefore find that the suspended sentences of 4 months and 3 months should be activated but that that they should run concurrently with the sentence I have just imposed of 12 weeks’ imprisonment. Since the Defendant has not spent any time in custody – on both occasions she was arrested, she was brought to court and then immediately bailed – she should serve the full 4 months of those concurrent sentences.
    5. Since I have found in favour of the Claimant, I award the Claimant its costs of the proceedings. I have before me a costs schedule in the sum of 5,387.10. I award the Claimant its costs in this sum, to be paid by the Defendant in 3 months.
    6. I make it clear that the Defendant does not need permission to appeal this decision, and that an immediate appeal may be made to a Circuit Judge at the first instance.
    7. I will provide a copy of this note to the Judicial Website team and direct that a transcript be prepared.