The King’s Head Country Hotel Ltd -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2026-LON-003447

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

25 August 2026

Before:

Alan Bates

Between:

THE KING on the application of
The King’s Head Country Hotel Ltd

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department


Order

Notification of Judge’s Decision on interim relief

Following consideration of: (i) the Claim Form and accompanying documents lodged by the Claimant, including application for interim relief made on Form N463; and (ii) the Defendant’s Acknowledgment of Service, Summary Grounds of Defence, and Interim Relief Response

ORDER BY ALAN BATES, SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

  1. Anonymisation of the sponsored worker with the initials SKF; reporting restrictions; restriction of access to the court file:
    (a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the name of the sponsored worker with the initials SKF (whose full name is stated in the original filed version of the Statement of Facts and Grounds) is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public;
    (ii) the aforesaid worker is to be referred to orally and in writing by her initials, ”SKF”.
    (b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the name of the sponsored worker with the initials SKF in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
    (c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4), unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any statement of case filed prior to the date of this Order unless the name of the worker with the initials SKF has been redacted by replacement with those initials.
    (d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this order must make an application, served on each party.
  2. Permission to apply for judicial review:
    (a) Permission is granted on Ground (a) but limited to the contention that the Defendant erred in her findings that the Claimant had breached the requirements of the Sponsor Guidance by way of failures relating to the pay, and/or absences from work, of the employee with the initials SKF (paragraphs 21-22, and 24-37, of the Statement of Facts and Grounds). For the avoidance of doubt, the permitted Ground (a) includes the contention that such errors may have had an impact on the Defendant’s determination of the appropriateness of revocation and that, accordingly, the revocation decision should be quashed.
    (b) Otherwise, permission is refused. (Permission is accordingly refused for the Claimant’s challenge as set out in paragraphs 23 and 38-52 of the Statement of Facts and Grounds.)
  3. Interim relief: Until the earliest of (i) the Court making a final order in these proceedings, (ii) the discontinuation of these proceedings by the Claimant, or (iii) the Court making an order discharging this paragraph of this Order, the Defendant: (a) must not take any curtailment action in respect of the visa of any individual who was, on 2 June 2026, a migrant worker sponsored by the Claimant, and who is still employed by the Claimant (a “Continuing
    Worker”);
    (b) must not refuse to extend or renew the visa of any Continuing Worker by reason, or in consequence, of the Defendant’s revocation of the Claimant’s Sponsor Licence;
    (c) must permit the Claimant to continue employing and remunerating the Continuing Workers (and must not prevent, or purport to prohibit, the Claimant from doing those things).
  4. Further, the Defendant must, within 7 days of the date of this Order, contact every Continuing Worker to whom it sent a notice in July 2026 cancelling his/her entry clearance, so as to withdraw that notice.
  5. Expedition:
    The hearing of the claim is expedited. The substantive hearing is to be listed for a date between 26 October and 21 December 2026 or as soon as possible thereafter, with a hearing time estimate of 1 day (including time for the giving of a reasoned oral judgment if the Judge decides to give judgment in that form).
  6. Case Management Directions:
    (a) The Defendant must, by 4:00 p.m. on 15 September 2026, file and serve (i) Detailed Grounds for contesting the claim or supporting it on additional grounds and (ii) any written evidence to be relied on.
    (b) The Claimant may serve evidence in reply provided that such evidence is filed and served by 4:00 p.m. on 25 September 2026.
    (c) The parties must agree the contents of the hearing bundle. An electronic version of the bundle must be prepared and lodged, in accordance with the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide Chapter 21 and the Guidance on the Administrative Court website, not less than 21 days before the date of the substantive hearing. The parties must, if requested by the Court, lodge 2 hard-copy versions of the hearing bundle.
    (d) The Claimant must file and serve a Skeleton Argument (maximum 25 pages), complying with CPR 54 PD para. 15 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide paras 20.1 to 20.3, not less than 14 days before the date of the substantive hearing.
    (e) The Defendant must file and serve a Skeleton Argument (maximum 25 pages), complying with CPR 54 PD para. 15 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide paras 20.1 to 20.3, not less than 7 days before the date of the substantive hearing.
    (f) The parties must agree the contents of a bundle containing the authorities to be referred to at the hearing. An electronic version of the bundle must be prepared in accordance with the Guidance on the Administrative Court website. The parties must, if requested by the Court, prepare a hard-copy version of the authorities bundle. The
    electronic version of the bundle and if requested, the hard copy version of the bundle, must be lodged with the Court not less than 2 clear working days before the date of the substantive hearing.
    (g) The time estimate for the substantive hearing is 1 day (including time for oral delivery of a reasoned judgment). If either party considers that this time estimate should be varied, they must inform the court as soon as possible.
    (h) CPR 2.11 (variation of timetable by written agreement between the parties) does not apply

Observations and reasons

(1) General assessment of the decision being challenged and whether the challenge is arguable: The claim challenges the Defendant’s decision dated 2 June 2026 to revoke the Claimant’s Sponsor Licence. The basis for the decision was the Defendant’s belief that the Claimant had breached various requirements of the sponsorship scheme set out in the document Workers and Temporary Workers: guidance for sponsors (the “Sponsor Guidance”). The specific respects in which the Defendant believed the Claimant had breached those requirements were set out in the decision letter. The alleged breaches related to essentially two matters.
(2) The first matter was that a sponsored employee (a female, initials SKF) had, in multiple months, received less pay than the monthly pro-rated proportion of the amount stated as an annual salary in her Certificate of Sponsorship (“CoS”), apparently in consequence of a combination of unpaid sick days and 1 week of unpaid leave. On my reading of the decision letter, the Defendant found this to constitute a breach of the following requirements of the Sponsor Guidance:
(a) paras S4.19-22 (and C1.15), which required sponsors to either stop sponsoring a worker, or to notify the Home Office via an online portal called SMS, if a sponsored worker was absent from work for more than 4 weeks in a year; and
(b) paras S4.30-31 (and C1.15), which required sponsors to either stop sponsoring a worker, or to notify the Home Office via SMS, if the worker’s salary was revised downwards / reduced.
(3) As to the finding that the Claimant breached para S4.19-22, it is, in my view, arguable that the Defendant erred. Para S4.19 stated that the cumulative 4 weeks was counted over a calendar year. But the Defendant, when concluding that the absences had cumulatively exceeded a 4-week period, counted absences in two different calendar years.
(4) As to the finding that the Claimant breached para S4.30-31, it is, in my view, arguable that the Defendant misconstrued those paragraphs. Arguably, a natural reading of those paragraphs is that they apply only where the sponsor has reduced the employee’s salary amount. In this case, there is no evidence that the Claimant reduced SKF’s salary; rather, the Claimant simply did not pay SKF for days when she was absent from work (cumulatively amounting to less than 4 weeks in each calendar year).
(5) The Defendant, in her Summary Grounds, seeks to avoid these difficulties, by focussing instead on the alleged failure of the Claimant to make or retain appropriate records so as to evidence that SKF’s absences (other than the 1-week unpaid leave) were indeed due to short-term sickness (experiencing menstrual pain). The Defendant says, essentially, that the Claimant’s failure to provide contemporaneous records to evidence the sickness incidents was itself a breach of the Sponsor Guidance. The Defendant has not, however, identified (whether in the decision letter or Summary Grounds) any specific requirement in the Sponsor Guidance for records to be made, or evidence to be retained, with which the Claimant failed to comply. (I note that a GP’s fit note would not generally be available for a sickness absence lasting a day or two.) Further and in any event, although the decision letter included sentences asserting that the Claimant had failed to provide evidence of the sickness absences, it is arguable that such alleged failures were not themselves relied on in the decision letter as constituting breaches of the requirements of the Sponsor Guidance.
(6) The second matter was that, in the cases of certain of its sponsored workers (including SKF but also a number of other workers), the Claimant failed to add a note to the worker’s CoS in circumstances where, at a time prior to the worker applying for a visa, the worker’s employment start-date had changed from that stated in the CoS. In the cases of those workers, the worker had submitted a visa application only after the start-date stated in the CoS had already passed, and the worker’s actual employment start date had been significantly later that the date stated in the CoS. The Defendant found that this alleged failure was a breach of para S3.13 of the Sponsor Guidance, which stated: “If the start date … changes before the worker has applied for entry clearance or permission, or before a decision has been made on their application, you should report this, as this may affect the period of entry clearance or permission that can be granted. You do this by adding a sponsor note to the CoS.”
(7) The Claimant contends that it did not breach para S3.13 as, pursuant to para S3.15-21, a worker may start the period of employment with the sponsor within 28 days of the ‘valid from’ date of his/her e-visa or entry clearance vignette, and there is no need for the employer to notify the Home Office of a ‘delay’ in the worker starting the employment provided that it does not exceed that 28-day period. In my view, however, paras S3.15-21 (which are essentially concerned with ‘delays’ occurring after entry clearance has been granted) cannot arguably be read as qualifying the specific requirement stated in para S3.13 (a requirement to add a sponsor note to the CoS, prior to the worker applying for entry clearance). The Claimant plainly failed to comply with that requirement, and the contrary is not arguable.
(8) In summary, therefore, the Claimant has an arguable case that the Defendant erred in her findings of breach in respect of the first matter, but not in respect of the second matter.
(9) I cannot properly refuse permission to apply for judicial review in respect of the Defendant’s findings relating to the first matter merely because the Defendant was correct in her findings of breach in respect of the second matter. It is possible that, had the only breaches identified by the Defendant been the ones relating to the second matter, she would not have decided that revocation of the Claimant’s Sponsor Licence was the appropriate response.
(10) I now turn to consider the specific grounds of challenge advanced by the Claimant.
(11) Ground (a) is arguable insofar as it relates to the arguable error I have identified above in respect of the first matter (see paras (2)-(5) above). But it is otherwise unarguable. As explained above, it is not arguable that the Defendant erred in its findings in respect of the second matter. Further, the Claimant’s case is not helped by the meritless argument that the requirements set out in the Sponsor Guidance constitute sex discrimination against women as only women suffer from menstrual pain. Those requirements apply to all sickness absences. There is no evidence that they disproportionately impact women, and the requirements are anyway not arguably disproportionate.
(12) Ground (b), which alleges procedural unfairness and disproportionate sanction, is unarguable.
(a) The Claimant was plainly on notice of the Defendant’s specific concerns, as illustrated by the Claimant’s ability to set out its case (e.g. the explanation given regarding SKF’s pay and absences) in correspondence prior to the decision being taken. It is not arguable that the Claimant was deprived of a fair opportunity to provide relevant explanations and evidence.
(b) As to the Claimant’s argument that the revocation was disproportionate, this is not arguable (save to the extent that it relates to the arguable case that the Defendant made an error in relation to the first matter, as already covered by the permission I have given for Ground 1). Sponsorship is a privilege, not a right; and the Defendant has a broad discretion to revoke Sponsor Licences, and is entitled to take a ‘light trigger’ approach: R (London St Andrew’s College) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 2496, per Haddon-Cave LJ at [29-30]. The Southcroft Healthcare case does not say otherwise: yes, there is a hierarchy of responses the Defendant may take to non-compliance with the requirements set out in the Sponsor Guidance; but the discretion to select an appropriate response is hers to exercise, provided her decisions are not irrational. It was not irrational for her to decide that revocation was the proportionate and appropriate response to the non-compliances she believed she had identified.
(13) Ground (c) is not arguable. The decision letter included reference to the impact on the Claimant (see para 33 of the decision letter), but the Defendant was entitled to give those matters little or no weight (weight being a matter for the decision-maker). The Court of Appeal has confirmed that the Defendant is not required to carry out a holistic assessment of the impacts of a contemplated revocation decision on the sponsor and its workers: R (Prestwick Care Limited) v SSHD, and R (Supporting Care Limited) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 184.
(14) Interim relief:
(a) The Claimant’s N463 (which inappropriately sought urgent judicial consideration of interim relief within 6 days) sits uncomfortably with the timetable on which the Claimant has itself brought the claim. The Defendant’s Pre-Action Protocol response was provided on 20 June 2026 but the claim was not filed until 24 July 2026.
(b) Given that the holding of a Sponsor Licence is a privilege and not a right, the Court should, in my view, be circumspect in its approach to applications for an interim order effectively requiring that a Sponsor Licence be reinstated (even if, at the same time, suspended). Such an order is unlikely to be appropriate where lesser interim relief, combined with provision for an expedited listing of the substantive hearing, would suffice to substantially mitigate the degree of injustice that might be suffered by the claimant and its existing employees pending the substantive hearing.
(c) I have, however, granted a measure of interim relief, doing so in the form set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of my Order, above. This will protect the Claimant’s employees who were already in its employment on the day of the Defendant’s decision letter revoking the Claimant’s Sponsor Licence, in respect of the risk of their visas being curtailed the Defendant prior to the substantive hearing. Such curtailment would be likely to have a very serious impact on them personally for reasons outside of their control, whilst also having debilitating (at least in the short term) impact on the Claimant’s ability to serve its customers/guests. I consider the interim relief I have ordered to be appropriate in terms of striking the right balance between the risk of injustice to each party and to third parties (i.e. the employees and the customers/guests) and also bearing in mind the public interest in the Defendant being able to take effective measures to prevent companies from misusing the sponsored worker scheme.
(15) Expedition: A degree of expedition in the listing of the substantive hearing is appropriate, given that the revocation of the Claimant’s Sponsor Licence is likely to continue having detrimental effects on the Claimant and/or its workers, notwithstanding the interim relief I have ordered.
(16) Anonymisation of the sponsored worker with the initials SKF; reporting restrictions; restriction of access to the court file: The matters to which this case relates arise partly with reference to the medical circumstances of the sponsored worker with the initials SKF. Of my own motion, I have imposed restrictions for protecting her privacy. Those measures are directed at ensuring that her name does not appear in any published judgment or other report of the proceedings, which would remain on the public record and needlessly publicise medical matters that are personal to her. I am satisfied that these restrictions (which will not inhibit public understanding of the issues in the proceedings, or how the Court has dealt with those issues) constitute a proportionate incursion upon the open justice principle.