Whyms -v- London and Quadrant Housing Trust

High CourtKing's Bench DivisionJudgment

Case Number: KB-2024-001001

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division

11 June 2025

Before:

His Honour Judge Marquand

Between:

Whyms

-v-

London and Quadrant Housing Trust

Judgment

  1. HHJ MARQUAND: This is the claimant Ms Whyms’ application dated 19 May 2025. The application is for an urgent interim injunction requiring the defendant to provide suitable alternative accommodation and immediate access to personal belongings. The grounds are that her continued residence in the current property is causing significant harm to health and wellbeing and the existing timetable for expert evidence and mediation does not provide effective protection.
  2. The claimant Ms Whyms is the tenant of the defendant London and Quadrant Housing Trust, a housing association. The claim is dated 4 April 2024. The claimant says that she is living in overcrowded temporary accommodation and has been living there since 7 February 2022. That property being 99B Helix Road (the “Temporary Property”). She has 3 children over the age of 16 years and a cat.
  3. The claimant is in that accommodation because the property that the defendant has provided under an assured tenancy, 95A Elm Park, was in disrepair and required works to be done on it. That was subject to two previous sets of proceedings, the details of which I have not got in front of me, but I do believe I need to know any detail for this application. The previous proceedings resulted in a Tomlin order of 1 March 2022 (that is the date of the order although it was made on 26 January), and that Tomlin order included a schedule (a Tomlin order being an order that attaches a contract between the parties). The schedule stated that the defendant would complete outstanding works on the 95A Elm Park property set out in a report and (another) schedule and that those would be completed by 4 April. In addition, the defendant would arrange for the storage of some of the claimant’s belongings while she was decanted to the Temporary Property. The reason being that there were three bedrooms in the Temporary Property rather than four in 95A Elm Park, so that extra storage was arranged.
  4. This matter came before Master Dagnall and the order is dated 15 May 2025 (the order was made on 7 May) having heard from the claimant and counsel for the defendant. There were a number of applications before the Master. The claimant’s application to expedite proceedings, for similar reasons to the ones I have heard today, and the defendant’s application to strike out the proceedings.
  5. Master Dagnall determination is recorded in a recital which was that the matter should be transferred to the county court after the certain directions have taken place and either there has been a mediation or equivalent, or the court views it appropriate for the transfer to take place before then. The orders that the Master made were an adjournment of the various applications and then a series of directions. Those required the defendant to provide a schedule of the works that had been done on the Temporary Property, for a single joint expert to report on the state of the property and a timetable to deal with potential out of court resolution and questions to the experts (and similar matters). The dispute between the parties is whether the works have been completed.
  6. I have had before me a schedule of works (it accompanied a witness statement of 10 June 2025) that appear to go further than the works required in the Tomlin order schedule. The schedule of works show there is one outstanding matter in relation to a risk assessment for front door fire safety purposes.
  7. The relevant law that I have to apply is well-known and is set out in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 and the claimant has provided a skeleton argument which addresses the issues and has addressed me on those points today, as has the defendant. Dealing with each of those parts of the test in turn, the first is: is there a serious issue to be tried? The claimant alleges breach of the housing duty is a breach of the Tomlin order, interference with article 8 rights and unlawful retention of personal property and she says the public law obligations of a housing provider. I am not satisfied that there are any issues under the Housing Act referred to in the claim form to be tried as against this defendant. The matters the claimant refers to from the Housing Act are supervisory actions of the local authority and not obligations on a body such as the defendants in this case.
  8. The question of the breach of the Tomlin order. It has been said to me that there has previously been enforcement or proceedings in relation to seeking to enforce the Tomlin order, which were struck out. The claimant says it was struck out because of her inactivity rather than a determination of the issue. Taking it at its highest there is a potential claim and I assume that is what the Master based his directions on. However, the Tomlin order does not provide for suitable temporary accommodation to be provided and there may or may not be an argument about whether such a term should be implied. But bearing in mind what this order seeks is removal from the current temporary accommodation to another temporary accommodation I am not satisfied that there is a serious issue to be tried.
  9. Unlawful retention of personal property – there is no arguable claim in relation to this as the defendant is not seeking to retain that property. I am not satisfied as to the nature of the issues that is underlying these proceedings. I speculate that the Master is of the same view otherwise he would have dealt with it. It is why the Master has dealt with the matter in the way that he has, which is to seek the parties to determine the real issue between them. In other words, has the defendant albeit late, complied with the Tomlin order so that the claimant can return to 95A Elm Park.
  10. The second part of the test is whether damages are an adequate remedy. The claimant has referred to the medical condition that her son suffers from and that surgery (for what is colloquially known as a “hole in his heart”) is a potential treatment for him. He unfortunately suffers from other conditions as well and I have seen the evidence from his treating doctors. But that evidence does not indicate that there is any urgency in relation to that treatment although I understand that there is an appointment today. The evidence before me today is certainly that he has that condition and that surgery has been advised, but that his mother is considering whether or not he should undergo it, as she is entitled to do. The claimant has also told me about her own health problems with a cough. But that related to 95A Elm Park before its repair and there is no evidence before me that would indicate that there is an urgent health problem here being caused by the current temporary accommodation.
  11. Similarly, if there is disrepair in the Temporary Property, that may or may not give rise to a claim in its own right. The defendant says that they have responded to the requests to repair within a reasonable timeframe and I have seen that in the witness statement of Caroline Austin dated 10 June 2025. The claimant disputes that the repairs have taken place or been fully effective. But in any event, there is nothing in that which would indicate that damages would not be adequate compensation. I do not see why damages are not an adequate remedy in this case, notwithstanding that I perfectly understand the claimant’s frustration. I am not satisfied on this point and damages are an adequate remedy here.
  12. The third stage is the balance of convenience and really where is the balance of justice/injustice. If I were to make an order, the defendant would have to find, in short order, alternative temporary accommodation in circumstances where the defendant is saying the 95A Elm Park property is suitable for re-occupation by the claimant. I bear in mind the claimants ongoing difficulties.
  13. However, I have to bear in mind that this would be not an order for the defendant to stop doing something but an order for the defendant to do something. I have no evidence about what an impact that would have upon other people to whom the defendant has responsibilities. However, I can infer that it would have an impact on other people as it is well-known there are challenges in housing availability. It may also be challenging for the defendant to find another suitable property for this claimant and her family. No submissions have been made to that effect but clearly that is something that I can properly take notice of. It seems to me that the balance of convenience would be not in favour of granting an injunction in this case.
  14. In summary, I do not see this matter as being urgent or a matter where I should make an order to force the defendant to provide alternative accommodation. The Master has put a timetable in place. The basis for making an interim injunction is not made out, as set out above, and for those reasons I refuse and dismiss this application.