ZTL -v- Chelmsford Family Court and another (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-002258

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

15 July 2025

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Dexter Dias

Between:

The King on the application of
ZTL

-v-

Chelmsford Family Court

Essex Children’s Services

Order

On an application dated 9 July 2025 by the Claimant for permission and interim relief (see Box 5: application to stay and set aside section 37 order; application for permission to be considered within 3 days; interim relief within 1 day; substantive hearing by 20 July 2025)

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant

ORDER BY THE HON. Mr Justice Dexter Dias

  1. Anonymity:
    (a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
    (ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as ZTL and her child as C.
    (b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
  2. Interim relief refused.

Reasons

  1. These proceedings are based on private law Family Court proceedings. It is necessary to anonymise the claimant mother to protect the article 8 rights of the subject child. Therefore, the claimant will be known as ZTL and her son as C.
  2. To understand the merits of this application, it is necessary to review the procedural history in the Family Court. I have set out my analysis more extensively than is customary to assist any future judges in the Administrative Court who may not be as fully acquainted with family law proceedings as I am.
  3. The hearing before DJ Molineaux on 7 May 2025 was listed pursuant to the order of HHJ Parnell. HHJ Parnell had set aside the order of DJ Foss dated 4 April 2025. The mother told the court that she no longer sought to vary DJ Foss’s order, which appears to relate back to a child arrangements order dated 14 July 2023. Both parents informed DJ Molineaux that the child arrangements order was “no longer needed”. The court ordered that:
    “In circumstances where the parties have lived together for a continuous period of 6 months the Order dated 14 July 2023 ceases to have effect and is discharged.”
  4. It is important to observe that the case number for those proceedings is CM25P00107. It is also significant that the hearing was a “Dispute Resolution Appointment”. In family proceedings, this hearing is further on in the private proceedings sequence than a FHDRA (first hearing). It more often occurs towards the end of private proceedings and can become, or indeed can be listed as, an early final hearing.
  5. On 20 June 2025, the Family Court sitting at Chelmsford, consisting of three lay magistrates, heard fresh proceedings. The case number is CM25P00370 (“370”). The case number is significant: it indicates that it was issued after the proceedings before DJ Molineaux which is an earlier listing number (“107”). The Bench recited that the mother “appears to be contesting a decision made by Judge Molineaux 7th May 2025.” Implausibly, the claimant asserts that she has made no such application. Therefore, the court has allegedly issued a case number and listed and heard a case for proceedings, she claims, she has not made and that, on her case, may not even exist. I should add that it is unclear what the claimant’s C100 dated 25 April 2025 is directed at. It is unlikely to be the 370 application as it predates 7 May. The relief sought is a consent order and thus it may be the application for the discharge of the existing child arrangements order and part of the 107 proceedings terminated by DJ Molineaux.
  6. In any event, a month after the 7 May decision, a further judge intervened. The lay bench noted in its 20 June order that on 9 June 2025 “ Judge O’Malley ordered Essex social care to file a letter outlining any involvement with the family.” No letter was before the court on 20 June 2025. Importantly, however, the court recorded at Recital 8:
    “The mother has a recent history of making child arrangement applications relating to C despite the parents purporting to be in a committed relationship”
  7. The new 370 proceedings fit the same pattern. I now examine the order the mother challenges by way of judicial review. It is an order by the Bench on 20 June 2025 for a section 37 report. The justification for the order is critical:
    “It appears to the court that it may be appropriate for a care or supervision order to be made with respect to the child because the mother is displaying erratic behaviour and is making irrational decisions for the child. The parents (in a previous application) are said to be in a committed relationship and coparenting C. The mother has suggested in correspondence that this may not be within her control and she has concerns about C if the parents were not in a relationship. The mother has made an application to the court for an order that is incoherent and neither parent has engaged with Cafcass for safeguarding or attended court today to identify the issues before the court. It is not clear whether C’s father is playing an active role in the child’s life or whether he agrees with the applications being made by the mother. C has been removed from one school and then re-enrolled causing disruption to his education and the school have raised concerns about the mother’s behaviour and engagement with them. The school have recorded behaviour from the mother that caused them concern. The father does not appear to be safeguarding C from this behaviour and at a previous court hearing was in full agreement with the mother about parenting their son. The court is concerned that C is at risk of harm based on this inconsistent and chaotic behaviour from both his parents.”
  8. This strikes me as a thoughtful and reasonable analysis. It is evident and of significance that the Bench noted that the mother has made a further application for an order “that is incoherent”. That is consistent with the content and tone of her application for relief by way of judicial review. The mother’s conduct caused the court to have concerns that the subject child is “at risk of harm”, and this is supported by reports about her conduct from an independent source, the school. In such circumstances, it is not arguable that it is inappropriate for the Family Court to seek a welfare assessment via section 37.
  9. The proceedings are listed to return to the Family Court on 1 August 2025. At that point the court will consider any section 37 report that Essex Social Services has filed. The case is listed as a Dispute Resolution Appointment.
  10. For judicial review, the permission test is straightforward and settled. It is about arguability: a real prospect of success. Judicial review proceedings are a remedy of last resort. The mother has filed an appeal in the Family Court dated 30 June 2025. It remains outstanding. She has applied for “expedition” in the appeal and a stay of the section 37 order. These are matters that should be resolved in family proceedings at first instance or on appeal. I judge that there is no real prospect of successfully setting aside the section 37 direction in the Administrative Court. It is not arguable. The proceedings plainly exist as a result of some action that the claimant has taken subsequent to the discharge of previous proceedings by DJ Molineaux.
  11. In such circumstances the interim relief sought by the mother to stay the section 37 order is manifestly misconceived. To reinforce this point, the Administrative Court Guide 2024 states at para 16.6.1:
    “When considering whether to grant interim relief while a judicial review claim is pending, the judge will consider whether there is a real issue to be tried and whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the interim order. Where the relief sought is a mandatory order against a public body, a strong prima facie case needs to be shown.”
  12. I find that there is no real issue to be tried in judicial review proceedings. The balance of convenience does not lie in favour of granting an interim order since one must recognise that at the heart of private law proceedings involving children is the cardinal principle that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. As to the mandatory order sought which appears to be that “All family proceedings are closed”, there is not a strong prima facie case to justify such a mandatory interim intervention. There should not have been resort to the Administrative Court by way of judicial review in respect of the claimant’s challenge to the section 37 order.
  13. Conclusion:
    a. The application for permission is refused;
    b. The application for interim relief is refused